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I 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The International Exchange Seminar was held at the Max Planck Institute 
Luxembourg on 25th October 2019 to debate the functioning and the effectiveness 
of the instruments that regulate family and succession law in the European Union, 
and propose possible improvements. It gathered 82 participants, including 
renowned academics from various institutions, judges, notaries, lawyers, and 
representatives of international organizations and family law associations from 
thirteen different Member States.  
The morning session of the International Exchange Seminar focused on the EU 
procedural regime for matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility. 
Particular regard was given to the Brussels II-bis Regulation Recast (Brussels II-ter 
Regulation)1 that will apply from August 1st, 2022. This Recast mainly affects the rules 
on parental responsibility but also comprises new provisions regarding matrimonial 
matters, notably regarding the recognition of out-of-court divorces. In this regard, the 
International Exchange Seminar provided an overview and a first critical assessment of 
the Recast. Among others, the issues addressed concerned the characterization of 
same-sex marriages under the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation and possible consistent 
solutions (e.g., a harmonized European definition of ‘marriage’ vs. the characterization 
via the lex fori). Concerning ‘private divorces’, the discussion showed that the 
recognition of divorce agreements is, in principle, to be welcomed, but the Recast 
does not regulate sufficiently certain aspects. For instance, the review of jurisdiction or 
the law applicable to private divorce agreements raises several questions. Other 
conclusions concern the consequences of a violation of the lis pendens-rule, which 
should be regulated by additional EU legislation.  
With regard to matters of parental responsibility, one of the most debated issues was 
Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation on the hearing of the child. Among other 
questions, it remains unclear to what extent national practices of the Member States 
will be affected by this new provision. Some participants argued that Article 21 only 
reiterates the importance of taking into account the child's views following the case-
law of the CJEU and the ECtHR. Other participants held that the provision mainly 
extends the principle of mutual trust to the different methods applied in the Member 
States for the hearing of the child. Concerning child abduction proceedings, 
participants concluded that the Brussels II-ter Regulation might fail to solve the 
primary deficiencies of the current Regulation. Instead, the new enforcement 
provisions of the Recast risk to create additional venues for litigation and to further 
extend the timeframe of the return proceedings.  
The afternoon session focused on the enhanced cooperation recently established with 
the adoption and entry into force of the Regulations on Matrimonial Property Regimes2 
 
1 Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child 
abduction, OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1 et seq. 
2 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes, OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 1–29. 
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and on Property Regimes for Registered Partnerships,3 on the one hand, and the 
Succession Regulation4 and the Regulation on Public Documents,5 on the other hand. 
The Regulations on the property regimes of international couples entered into force in 
2016 and, as of January 2019, they became applicable in 18 Member States. Their 
adoption is to be welcome in that it marks a significant – albeit partial, due to the 
limited territorial scope of their application – step forth in the architecture of EU 
private international and procedural law in family matters, and it contributes to the 
European Union’s endeavour and commitment to ensure consistency in the treatment 
of cross-border family law matters within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  
However, as it transpired from the discussions held at the International Exchange 
Seminar, these Regulations are characterised by a high degree of complexity. Among 
the pending questions that were identified are those of scope and characterisation, 
which stem, inter alia, from the lack of an autonomous definition of the term 
‘marriage’ under the Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes. Issues of 
coordination in the jurisdiction over property claims, on the one hand, and succession 
or divorce (or dissolution of the registered partnership), on the other hand, were also 
identified as problematic, notably with reference to the lack of clarity on whether the 
principle of perpetuatio fori applies in these cases. Numerous questions pertaining to 
applicable law were also raised, in particular vis-à-vis two core features of the 
Regulations and namely the determination of ‘habitual residence’ under the 
Regulations and the consequences of the conversion, in accordance with the laws of 
some Member States, of a marriage into a registerd partnerchip and vice-versa. 
Against this backdrop, the discussions shed the light on the paramount importance of 
education and training in this area of the law, to foster predictability and legal 
certainty. 
The second panel of the afternoon session covered the Succession Regulation and the 
Regulation on Public Documents. Overall, the discussions highlighted that the 
absence of certain autonomous notions and the interplay of diverging (if not mutually 
exclusive) national concepts are two core of the problems that have arisen and/or 
have been identified with respect to the interpretation and actual application of the 
Succession Regulation, to the detriment of consistency and predictability. In addition, 
courts and practitioners are faced with issues pertaining to party autonomy – which 
embodies the fundamental instrument to pursue estate planning and certainty, and 
should therefore be cherished. Finally, the coordination of the Regulation with other 
existing instruments – be it treaties or national laws – have also proven challenging. In 
spite of the hermeneutics of the Court of Justice of the European Union on some 
 
3 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area 
of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the 
property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 30–56. 
4 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 107–134. 
5 Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on 
promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public 
documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012, OJ L 200, 
26.7.2016, p. 1–136. 
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questions, these issues remain partly unsettled and are at the core of the debate both 
in academia and in practice.  
Finally, as concerns the Regulation on Public Document, it was highlighted that, while 
the Regulation does not regulate family law matters per se, it pursues the objective of 
curtailing excessive bureaucratic procedures and costs for citizens when they need to 
present in a Member State a public document issued in another Member State. Some 
of the formalities dealt with in the Regulation are, indeed, of paramount importance 
for the area of family and succession law: as such, its adoption and recent entry into 
force are to be welcomed. 
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Following the National Exchange Seminars organized by the partner universities of 
the EUFams II Project (Universities of Heidelberg (coord.), Lund, Milan, Osijek, 
Valencia, and Verona), the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg for International, 
European and Regulatory Procedural Law hosted the International Exchange 
Seminar on 25th October 2019. 
The purpose of the International Exchange Seminar was to address the difficulties 
met at the national level, to identify common patterns, and to share good practices 
with regard to the application of the EU instruments in family law. Notably, the 
Seminar discussed and explored possible solutions to controversial and problematic 
issues identified in the course of the National Exchange Seminars. 
The Seminar was held in English and it gathered renowned academics from various 
institutions, judges, notaries, lawyers, and representatives of international 
organizations and family law associations. Notably, the event was comprised of 82 
participants (57 academics, seven national judges and one judge from the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, eight lawyers, four State officers, two 
representatives of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, two 
representatives of the Project’s Academic Advisory Board as well as the External 
Evaluator) coming from thirteen different Member States (namely, Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). The participants were selected 
as attendees in light of their renowned expertise in cross-border family matters.  
The Seminar was structured in four panels addressing several subject matters of 
the EU Regulations on family and succession law. It also included an additional 
discussion session on the potential impacts of 'Brexit' on European family law. This 
selection of topics for the Seminar was based on the results and findings of the 
EUFams II Project hitherto achieved, notably the outcomes of the five National 
Exchange Seminars as well as the empirical survey conducted within the Project. 
A total number of eight speakers and four chairs were involved in the panels. Each 
panel comprised two short interventions: a first presentation carried out by a 
member of the Project, followed by an assessment performed by an invited expert. 
These interventions focused, respectively, on a descriptive overview and a concise 
assessment of problematic issues related to the different EU Regulations and 
international instruments on cross-border family and succession matters. While the 
first panel included two German scholars, the other panels featured presentations 
of research fellows from the Max Planck Institute Luxembourg as well as of two 
academics and one practitioner from different Member States (Belgium, Spain, and 
the UK). Similarly, the four panels and the additional discussion session were 
chaired by renowned scholars from different Member States (Austria, Germany, 
Greece, and Spain). Both the chairs and the speakers were selected upon invitation 
in light of their renowned expertise in international family and succession law. 
After each panel, the floor was immediately given to the international audience of 
experts for an open discussion chaired by the same academics as during the 
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presentations. The participants were invited to share their views and experiences 
and to discuss the issues addressed in the panels. 
The present Report summarizes the outcome of these fruitful debates under the so-
called Chatham House Rules (i.e., the names of the speakers are not mentioned).6 
 
 
6 The authors of this Report wish to acknowledge Mr. Arthur Bianco for his valuable editorial assistance. 
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B. FROM BRUSSELS II-BIS TO BRUSSELS II-TER: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
STATUS QUO AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS7 
I. MATRIMONIAL MATTERS  
1. The fragmentation of EU family law 
The first panel of the morning session focused on the procedural rules on matrimonial 
matters in the Brussels II-bis Regulation. Particular regard was given to the Brussels 
II-bis Regulation Recast, i.e., the future Brussels II-ter Regulation that will apply from 
August 1st, 2022. This Recast mainly affects the rules on parental responsibility but 
also comprises new provisions regarding matrimonial matters, notably regarding the 
recognition of out-of-court divorces. In this regard, the International Exchange 
Seminar provided an overview and a first critical assessment of the Recast. 
Matrimonial matters were chosen as a crucial topic to be discussed in the 
International Exchange Seminar in light of its practical significance. While most cross-
border family cases involve issues of parental responsibility and property regimes, 
their starting point is usually a divorce proceeding. As the other EU Regulations on 
family law often refer or directly link their jurisdiction rules to the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation, this instrument should be subject to particular scrutiny. 
European Procedural law as a whole is the broader perspective from which the 
current situation of European family law needs to be analyzed. Looking at the various 
procedural cross-border instruments, especially the Brussels I Regulation and its 
follow-ups, it is evident that there is a certain coherence among all of them. Notably, 
the Brussels I Regulation and its Recast (Brussels I-bis Regulation) function as a so-
called 'Mother Regulation' and constitute a reference point for all other EU 
Regulations in civil and commercial matters. 
In contrast, family matters do not follow this pattern. Even if the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation (soon Brussels II-ter Regulation) may serve as a reference source for a few 
terms, the situation is much more complicated and fragmented than in civil and 
commercial matters. In addition, the unanimity principle applicable in the special 
legislative procedure for family law matters (Art. 81(3) TFEU) as well as the principle 
of enhanced cooperation (Art. 326 et seq. TFEU) fragment the implementation of the 
Regulations on family law even further. 
As a starting point, the first panel of the International Exchange Seminar addressed 
the scope of application of the Brussels II-bis Regulation and its Recast. As will be 
reported further below, this analysis leads to a fundamental discussion on the 
definition of marriage as such. This discussion on the status quo of European family 
law mirrors the situation in the EU of today: On the one hand, most stakeholders can 
agree on core principles, but on the other hand, significant divergences exist that 
hinder the harmonious application of the Regulation. 
 
7 This Chapter was written by Dr. Marlene Brosch, Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law 
Luxembourg. 
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2. Problematic issues in the EU regime on matrimonial matters  
a) Applicability to out-of-court divorces 
The first presentation started with a descriptive overview of problematic aspects 
related to cross-border matrimonial matters that have been discussed in the National 
Exchange Seminars. Notably, two issues were identified as being unsettled: 'private 
divorces' and same-sex marriages. The discussion particularly involved the relevant 
changes made by the Council of the European Union at the final stage of the Brussels 
II-bis Recast. 
In its Recast Proposal of 20168, the European Commission announced that 'for 
matrimonial matters, the preferred policy option is retaining the status quo'. This 
policy option was probably adopted in light of the political sensitivity of cross-border 
matrimonial matters and cross-border recognition of personal status in general. 
However, the final version approved by the Council at the end of June 20199 entails 
significant changes for matrimonial matters and the recognition of so-called 'private 
divorces' in particular.  
First of all, the presentation addressed the broad term of 'private divorces' that is often 
used for a multitude of divorce types. Concerning the legal nature of such divorces, a 
first differentiation must be drawn between unilateral and consensual divorces. 
Another distinction relates to the function of the authority involved in the divorce and 
to the constitutive or declaratory nature of its involvement. Furthermore, 'private 
divorces' may be classified according to the participation of a public or private third 
party and to the degree of its involvement. For instance, the authority involved may 
scrutinize or control the substance of divorce agreements. 
More specifically, the presentation highlighted the existence of several degrees of 
'privateness' of divorces. On the one end of the scale, 'private divorces' are performed 
mostly before or through religious institutions. In contrast, the types of 'private 
divorces' known in EU jurisdictions are less 'private' and thus located on the other end 
of the scale. However, their classification is difficult since these divorces may involve 
different professions (notaries, lawyers, public prosecutors, or civil registrars) that 
carry out various functions. Hence, depending on the characteristics of these 
'European' divorces, they may no longer be considered as private and would instead 
appear to be 'public' divorces without the involvement of courts (i.e., 'out-of-court 
divorces'). 
The presentation briefly reminded that the CJEU has recently sparked the discourse 
on the recognition of (purely) 'private' divorces in the Sahyouni case10. In Germany, 
such divorces were formerly considered to be covered by the Rome III Regulation. 
 
8Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast), COM(2016) 411 final, p. 10, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0411&from=EN. 
9 See the official press release of 25th June 2019 of the European Council, 'More effective rules to deal 
with cross border matrimonial matters and parental responsibility issues', available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/25/more-effective-rules-to-deal-with-
cross-border-matrimonial-matters-and-parental-responsibility-issues/.  
10 CJEU, Judgment of 20.12.2017, Sahyouni v Mamisch, C-372/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:988. 
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The main argument for this interpretation was Recital 9, which claimed that the Rome 
III Regulation 'should create a clear, comprehensive legal framework in the area of the 
law applicable to divorce'. However, in the Sahyouni decision, the CJEU held that the 
Rome III Regulation does not apply to private divorces, and especially not to the case 
at hand where a representative of one spouse proclaimed the dissolution of the 
marriage in front of a religious court in Syria ('talaq'). To reach this conclusion, the 
CJEU primarily relied on a textual interpretation of the Rome III Regulation, which 
repeatedly refers to terms such as 'courts' and 'proceedings'. According to the CJEU, 
these terms are indicative of the exclusion of private divorces in the EU regime for 
cross-border divorces. As a result, the Court held that unilateral divorces performed 
via religious authorities do not fall under the substantive scope of the Rome III 
Regulation.  
Looking beyond the Sayhouni decision, the legal landscape is still unclear. Concerning 
the Brussels II-bis Regulation, its application to private divorces pronounced in a 
Member State11 is moot. Admittedly, the ruling in the Sahyouni case is relatively 
ambiguous: Even if the judgment only concerns the scope of application of the Rome 
III Regulation, the CJEU deducted additional arguments from the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation to deny the applicability of the Rome III Regulation.12 The decisive criterion 
used by the CJEU is that the divorce in question has to be declared either by a 
national court or 'under the scrutiny' of a public authority to be covered by the EU 
regime. 
According to the invited speaker, it is debatable whether the types of out-of-court 
divorces regulated by several Member States fulfill the criteria set forth by the CJEU. 
Assuming that the EU regime on matrimonial matters does not encompass such 
divorces, Member States may only apply their domestic private international law to 
recognize an out-of-court divorce pronounced in another Member State. This 
approach could create a problematic relationship between domestic law and EU 
norms. 
However, this unsatisfying situation might change in the future, as the Brussels II-ter 
Regulation provides for specific rules on the recognition of out-of-court divorces. 
The starting point of these new rules is the distinction between 'judgments' on the one 
hand, and 'authentic instruments' and 'agreements' on the other hand. The Brussels 
II-bis Regulation already adopts this distinction for recognition and enforcement (Art. 
21, Art. 46). According to Art. 2(4) of the Brussels II-bis Regulation, 'judgments' are, 
essentially, decisions of state courts. In addition, the Recast defines 'authentic 
instruments' as official documents drawn up or registered by a competent authority of 
a Member State (e.g., a notary), whereas 'agreements' have to be concluded by the 
parties and then recorded by a public body of a Member State (Art. 2(2) no. 2, 3 
 
11 The Brussels II-bis Regulation does not apply to private divorces from Third States, as they fall out of 
the Regulation's scope of application that only covers divorce decisions from EU Member States. 
12 The CJEU referred to the fact that the Brussels II-bis Regulation relates to 'judgments', i.e., decisions 
pronounced by a court of a Member State. The Court considered this reference in light of the principle 
of harmonious application of the Brussels II-bis Regulation and the Rome III Regulation. See Recital 10 
of the Rome III Regulation: 'The substantive scope and enacting terms of this Regulation should be 
consistent with [the Brussels II-bis Regulation]'. 
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Brussels II-ter Regulation). As the Recast clearly states that a public authority has to 
be involved concerning 'agreements', purely 'private' divorces fall outside the scope of 
the Recast.13  
To recognize a private divorce agreement in another Member State, the Recast sets 
forth four conditions (Art. 65 et seq.): (1) The divorce agreement must comply with 
the respective definition of the Regulation; (2) The agreement has to be registered (3) 
by the authority of a Member State having jurisdiction under the ordinary jurisdiction 
rules of the Regulation (Art. 3 et seq.); (4) The agreement must have a binding legal 
effect in the Member State of origin. Upon fulfillment of these criteria, the 'private' 
divorce agreement will be automatically recognized in all other Member States to the 
same extent as a court decision. To effectuate the recognition, however, the party 
seeking the recognition has to request a certificate before the competent authority in 
the state of origin. This certificate may only be issued if the Member State of origin 
had jurisdiction under the Regulation and if the divorce agreement is legally binding in 
that Member State (Art. 66 Brussels II-ter Regulation). 
In practice, lawyers involved in the drafting of private divorce agreements will have to 
examine whether the Member State of the issuing authority has jurisdiction according 
to the Regulation. Otherwise, parties may end up with an agreement that is valid in the 
Member State of origin but cannot be recognized in the other Member States. 
Furthermore, even if the parties obtain a certificate, the recognition of a divorce 
agreement may be refused on the following grounds laid down in Article 68 Brussels 
II-ter Regulation: 1) if the agreement violates public policy; 2) if the agreement is 
irreconcilable with a divorce agreement in the Member State of recognition; 3) if the 
agreement conflicts with an earlier agreement or decision rendered in another 
Member State or Third State. 
The presentation also referred to legislative developments in some Member States that 
include matters of parental responsibility in out-of-court divorce agreements. Unlike 
agreements exclusively dealing with divorce matters, agreements on parental 
responsibility have enforceable contents that are subject to additional rules under the 
Recast (Art. 68(2),(3) Brussels II-ter Regulation). 
b) Applicability to same-sex marriages 
The second topical issue addressed in the first panel relates to both the Brussels II-bis 
Regime and the Rome III Regulation, namely, whether these instruments apply to 
same-sex marriages.14 This issue is particularly controversial because, at present, 
there is no definition of 'marriage' in EU Private International Law. 
In its traditional concept, marriage is the union between a man and a woman. 
According to the prevailing, yet restrictive opinion, the Brussels II-bis regulation does 
not apply to same-sex marriages as they were not legally recognized in the EU at the 
time the Regulation was promulgated. Therefore, same-sex marriages may not fall 
under the substantive scope of the Recast, as Recital 90 refers to the principle of 
 
13 This is explicitely laid down in Recital 14 Brussels II-ter Regulation. 
14 This category includes marriages involving at least one person of neutral gender. 
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continuity of the interpretation between the Brussels II-Regulation, the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation, and the Recast.  
According to a different, more dynamic definition, the strict heterosexual concept 
within the Brussels II-bis Regulation cannot be maintained in light of the increasing 
number of Member States recognizing same-sex marriages in their domestic legal 
systems. This second solution is also endorsed by the principle of non-discrimination 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
In light of this controversial situation, participants criticized that the Recast does not 
provide for an autonomous definition of 'marriage', which could ensure a uniform 
application of the Regulation. However, the annexes of the Recast might indicate that 
the legislator has, indeed, addressed this issue: The new standard forms replace the 
current terminology of 'husband' and 'wife' with the more gender-neutral term 
'spouse'.  
Concerning the Rome III Regulation, an argument in favor of including same-sex 
marriages in its scope of application may be derived from Article 13. This provision 
states that the Member States are not obliged to recognize a marriage if the marriage 
in question is 'not valid' under the lex fori. Therefore, if a Member State can refuse the 
recognition of a particular form of marriage, such as same-sex marriages, this means 
that they are, in principle, covered by the Regulation. Otherwise, the mentioned rule 
would not have a proper meaning.  
On the other hand, two arguments speak against the applicability of the Rome III 
Regulation to same-sex marriages: First, Article 1(2) states that the Regulation does 
not apply to the existence, validity, or recognition of a marriage. Second, Recital 10 
indicates that the scope of application of the Brussels II-bis Regulation and the Rome 
III Regulation shall be aligned. Consequently, if the Brussels II-bis Regulation does not 
apply to the dissolution of same-sex marriages, then the Rome III Regulation cannot 
be applicable either. 
c) Further open questions 
To conclude, the presentation briefly referred to additional open questions on 
matrimonial matters that have been raised in the National Exchange Seminars, such 
as the lack of party autonomy and the incentive to forum shop, or the lack of 
harmonized rules on residual jurisdiction and subsidiary jurisdiction. These 
deficiencies remain unsolved in the Brussels II-ter Regulation. Furthermore, it remains 
unclear whether the special public policy-clause in Article 10 Rome III Regulation 
refers to a situation in which the applicable divorce law discriminates against a spouse 
in abstracto or in concreto.15 Another issue addressed in the National Exchange 
Seminars concerns the Liberato case16 of the CJEU and the lack of effective sanctions 
against the violation of lis pendens.  
3. Future developments in the Brussels II-ter Regulation 
The second presentation was conceived as a critical response to the previous 
intervention. The speaker focused on the changes that the Brussels II-ter Regulation 
 
15 The CJEU did not answer this question in the Sahyouni case (C-372/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:988). 
16 CJEU, Judgment of 16.1.2019, Liberato v Grigorescu, C-386/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:24. 
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will bring concerning matrimonial matters and welcomed the general orientation of 
this Recast. 
a) The new regime for the recognition of out-of-court divorces 
The speaker delved deeper into the new provisions on 'private divorces' and notably 
into the mechanism and prerequisites of their recognition. In principle, granting more 
autonomy to spouses should be welcomed, especially if there are no children and no 
disputes on the consequences of the divorce involved. Nevertheless, the procedural 
autonomy provided for by the Recast is subject to certain limits: The agreement 
concluded by the parties must comply with the autonomous definition of the 
Regulation, it must be legally binding and registered by a competent authority of a 
Member State having jurisdiction.  
After having explored the prerequisites for obtaining the recognition of an out-of-court 
divorce, the question arises whether the Recast defines the authority and the stage of 
proceedings to review these requirements. According to Article 103 of the Recast, the 
Member States shall communicate to the European Commission the courts or 
authorities competent to issue certificates for divorce agreements. As the Member 
States can elect whatever institution they want to assume this role, there is no 
safeguard against the registration of agreements without any scrutiny of the 
requirements.  
Other unclear aspects concern the power and jurisdiction of courts. In Germany, 
'private divorces' are not allowed at the moment. This fact may incite spouses residing 
in Germany to seize a notary in France to register their divorce agreement and to have 
it recognized in Germany with a certificate issued under Recast. German courts 
cannot declare such an approach as contrary to public policy because this particular 
refusal ground does not apply to a lack of jurisdiction.  
According to the Recast, this situation might be treated differently: Under EU 
procedural law, a lack of jurisdiction does, in general, not constitute a refusal ground. 
In the same vein, the refusal grounds for divorce agreements in Article 68 Brussels II-
ter Regulation do not include the prerequisites laid down in Article 66, such as the 
requirement of having a competent authority registering the agreement. However, the 
general rule in Article 69 on the prohibition of review of the jurisdiction of the court of 
origin does not explicitly include Article 68. Therefore, a lack of competence could 
exceptionally constitute a refusal ground with regard to divorce agreements.  
Furthermore, it remains unclear how to determine the law applicable to divorce 
agreements outside the scope of the Rome III Regulation. Taking into account the 
criteria laid down in the Sahyouni decision of the CJEU, the French model of out-of-
court divorces may not fall under the Rome III Regulation, whereas the 'private 
divorce' under Spanish law might be covered. This diverging interpretation is 
problematic and leads to the same open question that has been raised concerning the 
lack of jurisdiction. If French divorce law applies, can a German court refuse the 
recognition of the French 'private divorce'? Normally, the non-applicability of the 
Rome III Regulation cannot constitute a refusal ground. This situation of uncertainty 
should be solved. 
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b) The characterization of same-sex marriages in EU Procedural law 
The presentation also shed light on the long-standing discussion about same-sex 
marriages and the extent to which the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation applies, if at all.  
The starting point is Recital 90 Brussels II-ter Regulation, which lays down the 
principle of continuous interpretation. One the one hand, same-sex marriages were 
not (yet) a significant issue when the Brussels II Convention was drafted in the late 
1990s. On the other hand, some areas of the Recast seem to expressively address 
these types of unions, e.g., concerning the use of gender-neutral terms in the 
annexes. Some participants argued that these new terms express a deliberate choice 
of the legislator. Also, the 'evolutive' or 'dynamic' interpretation applied by the 
European Court of Human Rights was presented as an approach to reading the 
Recast. 
c) Further controversial issues 
The National Exchange Seminars raised numerous other problematic questions 
concerning matrimonial matters which have not been taken into consideration in the 
Recast. Among others, the lack of hierarchy in Article 3 Brussels II-bis Regulation and 
the discriminatory jurisdiction rules17 will remain unchanged.  
The recent judgment of the CJEU18 concerning the provision on the transfer of 
jurisdiction (Art. 15 Brussels II-bis Regulation) was also briefly addressed in the 
context of forum shopping. This decision concerned a case where forum shopping led 
to parallel proceedings in the UK and Romania, and both seized courts had 
jurisdiction under the Brussels II-bis Regulation. The CJEU held that the transfer rule 
is not applicable if both courts are competent as to the substance of the matter under 
Article 12 and Article 8 Brussels II-bis Regulation. This situation has to be solved via 
the lis pendens-rule (Art. 19), so that the court first seized will have the priority to rule 
on the matter and the court second seized must stay the proceedings. However, the 
solution via lis pendens may not be the ideal one in some instances, in which granting 
the transfer of jurisdiction to a court of another Member State would be more 
favorable instead. By way of example, the speaker referred to a situation in which 
proceedings on marital property start first, and divorce proceedings start 
subsequently. There is currently no possibility for a transfer of jurisdiction to the later 
court, or vice-versa.   
The speaker commenting on the Brussels II-ter Regulation also addressed the 
controversial Liberato decision of the CJEU and argued that the Recast is even stricter 
than the ruling of the CJEU. Furthermore, the lack of lis-pendens rules concerning 
parallel proceedings in a Third State is still an unresolved problem. 
To conclude, the presentation addressed further reform proposals de lege ferenda. 
Notably, the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation could serve as a 'reference Regulation' 
similar to the Brussels I-bis Regulation. However, to achieve this status, the Brussels 
II-bis/-ter Regulation should contain a comprehensive, yet shorter set of rules on 
 
17 According to Art. 3(a)(v) Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation, a person may file for divorce in the Member 
State where he/she has been residing for at least a year, whereas this waiting period is shortened to six 
months if that person is a national of the Member State in question (Art. 3(a)(vi)). 
18 CJEU, Judgment of 4.10.2018, IQ v JP, C-478/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:812. 
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jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of decisions. As to the possible inclusion 
of applicable law rules, the speaker welcomed the development of so-called 'mixed 
regulations' (such as the Succession Regulation or the Regulation on Property 
Regimes) but pointed out the difficulties arising out of an enhanced cooperation. 
4. Critical analysis of selected issues in the open discussion   
a) The definition of 'marriage' and the inclusion of same-sex couples 
Following the two presentations concerning the EU regime on matrimonial matters, 
the floor was given to the audience for an open discussion.  
One of the most controversial issues tackled in the debate concerned the definition of 
'marriage'. From a general point of view, the lack of an explicit definition of 'marriage' 
in the Recast of the Brussels II-bis Regulation was criticized as a significant 
deficiency. Different solutions were taken into consideration and heavily debated. 
One of these solutions concerns Recital 17 of the Regulation on Matrimonial 
Property Regimes, which states that the notion of 'marriage' is not defined by the 
Regulation but by national law.  The participants discussed whether this approach 
could be applied by analogy to the Brussels II-ter Regulation and other EU 
instruments on Private International Law. In this case, Member States could 
individually decide whether or not to apply their domestic rules.  
In response to this argument, other participants were in favor of having an 
autonomous interpretation of the concept of 'marriage' within the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation. They argued that the Property Regimes Regulations were adopted via the 
Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (Art. 326 et seq. TFEU), which expresses the 
intentions of a limited number of Member States. Therefore, these Regulations have to 
be strictly differentiated from the situation in the Brussels II-bis Regulation. Besides, 
the value of Recitals should not be overestimated. They are not equal to an operative 
provision, and the CJEU has deviated from Recitals in some instances, especially in 
the context of the Brussels I Regulation. However, the CJEU might outline an 
autonomous interpretation in its case-law, notably by considering the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights as a steppingstone. The widely accepted Coman judgment19 is 
already a small step in this direction. The CJEU held that the Member States should 
recognize same-sex marriages concluded in another State in the context of residence 
rights, yet migration matters and family law are closer than one might think.  
Other participants argued that the Recast does not leave the definition of 'marriage'  
wholly untouched. First, according to experts involved in the preparation of the 
Brussels II Convention, no reference was made to marriage as being exclusively a 
union between a man and a woman. The lack of an explicit legal definition in the text 
of the Convention and, later on, of the Regulation was a deliberate move. Second, the 
use of the gender-neutral term 'spouse' in the annexes of the Recast is a persuasive 
argument. In light of the negotiations on the Recast, this linguistic change is a 
deliberate choice, and it addresses the difficulties that arise from the practical use of 
the current standard forms. For instance, judges and civil servants in Belgium 
generally apply the Brussels II-bis Regulation and the Rome III Regulation to same-
 
19 CJEU, Judgment of 5.6.2018, Coman et al., C-673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385. 
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sex marriages in light of their 'matrimonial' essence, but the terms 'husband' and 
'wife' in the standard forms are hampering the issuing of certificates. 
The unclear definition of the term 'marriage' is also a significant issue concerning 
the scope of application of the two Property Regimes Regulations. While the 
Regulation on the Property Consequences of Registred Partnerships entails a 
remarkably broad, gender-neutral definition that could also include same-sex 
marriages, there is no parallel definition of 'marriage' in the Regulation on Matrimonial 
Property Regimes.20 Special attention was drawn to the relationship between marriage 
and registered partnership by way of example of legislative reforms in Italy. The 
recently introduced Article 32-bis of the Italian Private International Law Act 
requalifies same-sex marriages concluded abroad between Italian citizens as a civil 
partnership according to Italian domestic law. This provision creates significant 
uncertainty concerning the Property Consequences Regulations. In practice, if an 
Italian judge is seized according to the rules of the Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships, the marriage in question will be requalified 
as a civil partnership under Italian law, i.e., the law of the state of origin. If a Belgian 
judge is seized with proceedings on divorce and division of property of Italian same-
sex spouses living in Belgium, which is possible via a combination of Article 3 
Brussels II-bis Regulation and Article 5 of the Matrimonial Property Consequences 
Regulation, the question arises whether the Belgian judge must also apply the Italian 
PIL provision on 'downgrading' the same-sex marriage to a civil partnership. 
Looking from a broader perspective, the problematic qualification of same-sex 
marriages in EU family law highlights a lacking consensus among the EU Member 
States. Western-European liberal mainstream leads to the conclusion that if national 
law qualifies a union between two persons of the same sex as a 'marriage', this 
definition applies to all (national and European) instruments relevant for that marriage. 
This conclusion is not as evident in other legal systems. Only half of the EU Member 
States have, so far, 'accepted' same-sex marriages. In light of this diversity, an 
autonomous interpretation of 'marriage' that moves away from national concepts 
proves to be complicated. Notably, some Eastern-European States have codified the 
term 'marriage' as being a union between a man and a woman in their constitutions. 
From their perspective, an obligation to ignore their constitutional framework merely 
based on the EU Family Law Regulations seems hardly understandable. 
A different solution worth considering is to permit the Member States to 'opt-out' from 
certain subject matters of the scope of the Brussels II-bis Regulation (e.g., the 
applicability to same-sex marriages). However, by granting this possibility to 'legally' 
deviate from the Regulation, private international law instruments would become 
optional and 'à la carte', leading to further fragmentation within EU Family Law. 
A scholar from the UK argued that an exceeding imposition of the EU's viewpoint to 
the Member States was, to a certain extent, also considered by the United Kingdom in 
the context of the 'Brexit'-Referendum. The EU should try to strike a balance 
 
20 Applying the Registered Partnerships Regulation to same-sex marriages could solve the problematic 
situation with regard to Member States that do not recognise same-sex marriages. However, this 
solution could involve certain disadvantages as the Registered Partnerships Regulation is not identical 
with the Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes; see infra, Chapter D. 
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between facilitating the free movement of persons and 'international' families, on 
the one side, and 'imposing' mainstream-rules to national legal orders, on the other 
side. The European legislator should accept that, at present, Member States follow 
an inhomogeneous approach towards same-sex marriages in their national laws, but 
a consensus might be reached in the future. 
b) Out-of-court divorces 
The new rules in the Brussels II-ter Regulation on cross-border recognition of 'private' 
divorce agreements (Art. 64–68) raised several topics of concern in the discussion.  
The decisive question is whether the agreement has been registered or not. The 
Recast follows the approach that, if a divorce agreement is registered and its effects 
clearly defined, it shall be recognized in all other Member States. In the opposite case, 
if there is no registration, the results of and the prerequisites for a 'private' divorce 
agreement may remain unclear, and such documents should not freely circulate. 
Due regard was given to the requirement under the Brussels II-ter Regulation on the 
jurisdiction of the Member State in which the agreement has been registered (Art. 
64 et seq.). This cross-cutting issue is not only relevant in the Brussels II-ter 
Regulation but also, for instance, in the Succession Regulation.21 It raises the general 
question of the applicability of jurisdiction rules to non-judicial authorities, such as 
notaries, that render 'decisions' under EU instruments. Allowing to review their 
jurisdiction in the Member State of recognition is questionable in light of mutual trust 
and the free movement of judgments. However, the competence of the registering 
authority is particularly sensitive in cases of forum shopping, i.e., if the spouses 
purposely choose to have their divorce agreement registered in a particular country 
without having any close connection to this state. Courts in the state of recognition 
might show a certain degree of mistrust whether the registering authority has correctly 
assessed its jurisdiction.  
Concerning Article 103 Brussels II-ter Regulation that requires the Member States to 
communicate their registering authorities to the Commission, the European legislator 
should be aware of the fact that the designated authorities may have vast territorial 
competences under national law, such as notaries under French law. This domestic 
distribution of competence may be incompatible with EU jurisdiction rules. Therefore, 
it could be useful to have uniform jurisdiction rules applied to notaries and other 
internal authorities, too. 
c) The Liberato judgment of the CJEU (C-386/17) 
Most participants disagreed with the CJEU's decision of January 16th, 2019, in the 
case of Liberato v Grigorescu (C-386/17). First, the Court qualified Article 19 Brussels 
II-bis Regulation on lis pendens as a jurisdictional rule. This argument was criticized 
 
21 For example, a party may deliberately seek to obtain an authentic instrument in a particular state 
even if that state is not competent under the Succession Regulation. At the stage of recognition in 
another Member State, the judges may oversee or disregard the jurisdiction rules of the Regulation. The 
question on whether jurisdiction must be established under the Succession Regulation if notaries issue 
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insofar as, from a technical and teleological point of view, rules on lis pendens and 
rules on jurisdiction operate differently. While the latter set limits to the court's 
adjudicative power from the outset, the former aim at coordinating parallel 
proceedings. Second, the CJEU has so far strictly applied the lis pendens-rules under 
the Brussels I-bis Regime. However, in the Liberato case, the Court follows a different 
approach by stating that a violation of lis pendens shall have no consequence. 
From a practitioner's point of view, the judgment of the CJEU has significant 
drawbacks in Italy. Under Italian law, a spouse seeking divorce has to file for legal 
separation first. Due to the lengthiness of these proceedings, the other spouse 
might seize a court in another Member State to obtain a judgment and to have it 
recognized in the Member State where the first proceedings are still pending. This 
situation was precisely the case in Liberato: After the husband had initiated legal 
separation proceedings in Italy, the wife started divorce proceedings before a 
Romanian court that issued a divorce decree relatively quickly. She then applied 
for incidental recognition of the Romanian divorce decree before the Italian court 
based on the Brussels II-bis Regulation, even though she had started the Romanian 
proceedings in violation of lis pendens-rule. According to the Liberato judgment, such 
tactics remain sanctionless under the Brussels II-bis Regime. 
To many participants' disappointment, the Brussels II-ter Regulation clearly confirms 
the CJEU's ruling: Recital 56 of the Recast states that the recognition of a decision 
should only be refused if the refusal grounds exhaustively provided for in the 
Regulation are fulfilled. Any refusal ground not listed in the Regulation cannot be 
invoked, such as the violation of lis pendens. However, the CJEU's decision could be 
overruled and corrected by additional EU legislation.22 
Furthermore, the rules on lis pendens in the Brussels II-ter Regulation specifically 
address parallel proceedings involving an exclusive choice-of-court agreement under 
Article 10 Brussels II-ter Regulation. Article 20(4),(5) of the Recast adopt the 
provisions of Article 31 Brussels I-bis Regulation on the reversal of priority. Some 
participants criticized this synchronization, as the rationale in contract law cannot 
equally apply to family law and parental responsibility in particular.  
d) Party autonomy in matrimonial matters 
Unlike the Recast Proposal of 2006,23 the Brussels II-ter Regulation does not allow for 
choice-of-court agreements in matrimonial matters. This gap is particularly regretful as 
the complementary Rome III Regulation enables spouses to choose the applicable 
divorce law but only from the perspective of the Member States that participated in 
the Enhanced Cooperation Procedure (Art. 326 et seq. TFEU). A choice-of-court 
agreement could secure the effectiveness of a choice-of-law agreement by 
determining the jurisdiction of a Member State that applies the Rome III Regulation.   
 
22 By way of example, the lis pendens-rules of the Brussels I-bis Regulation was introduced to remedy 
the harsh interpretation of the CJEU in the case Gasser v Misat (C-116/02, ECLI:EU:C:2003:657), 
where a party disregarded an exclusive jurisdiction agreement and seized a court in another Member 
State.   
23 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction 
and introducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters, COM(2006) 399 final, p. 15 et 
seq. 
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A possible reason why the European legislator was reluctant to introduce a choice-of-
court option for divorce proceedings refers to the best interests of the child. If the 
parents could agree on the jurisdiction of a Member State for their divorce 
proceedings, this jurisdiction would also be relevant for ancillary proceedings on 
parental responsibility under Article 12(1) of the Brussels II-bis Regulation. Provided 
that the child is not habitually resident in the forum prorogatum, the prorogation may 
not be compatible with the best interests of the child. However, Article 10 of the 
Brussels II-ter Regulation now grants even further party autonomy with regard to 
parental responsibility. At the same time, this provision strongly emphasizes the best 
interests of the child as a substantive criterion. This safeguard mechanism could have 
been extended to choice-of-court agreements entered into for the main proceedings 
on divorce. By contrast, if there are no children involved in the divorce, there is no 
such need for special protection, and spouses should have the possibility to conclude 
choice-of-court agreements under the EU regime. 
e) Treaties with the Holy See 
During the discussion, attention was also drawn to a particular, yet often over-looked 
provision in the Brussels II Regime. Article 99 of the Brussels II-ter Regulation 
addresses the relationship between the Regulation and treaties entered into by several 
Member States with the Holy See. This provision was first introduced in the Brussels II 
Convention but already raised several questions at that time. Agreements with the 
Holy See are not compatible with the scope of application of the Brussels II Regime, 
namely, civil matters. However, in light of the unanimity requirement in the Council, it 
was necessary to include such agreements, as the respective EU instruments would 
not have been adopted otherwise. Twenty years later, the unanimity principle has, 
once again, led to the explicit reference to treaties with the Holy See. 
II. PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY (INCLUDING CHILD ABDUCTION) 
1. From Brussels II-bis to Brussels II-ter 
The second panel of the Seminar dealt with matters related to children as provided for 
by the Brussels II-bis Regime. At the outset of the recast procedure of the Brussels II-
bis Regulation, parental responsibility matters were the primary motivation to reform 
the current system. This particular area of law seemed to have caused severe 
problems that needed to be addressed urgently.24 Therefore, the second panel of the 
Seminar was conceived to shed light on these practical deficiencies and the solutions 
proposed in the new Brussels II-ter Regulation. 
2. Practical deficiencies and legislative developments in the Brussels II-bis Regime 
This first presentation had two purposes: First, it summarised the problematic issues 
concerning parental responsibility identified in the National Exchange Seminars. 
Second, it described the significant changes in the Brussels II-ter Regulation that will 
apply from August 1st, 2022. Specifically, the presentation focused on three 
 
24 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast), COM(2016) 411 final, p. 2. 
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problematic areas: the child's best interests, the child abduction regime, and the 
cooperation between Central Authorities and courts. 
a) The best interests of the child 
An overarching theme of the Brussels II-bis Regulation and the Recast is the child's 
best interest. However, the Regulation does not define this notion, and the National 
Exchange Seminars raised the question of whether more 'European' guidance was 
necessary to facilitate the practical application of the Regulation. Indeed, the Brussels 
II-ter Regulation provides for further indications. 
For the sake of clarity, the Recast harmonizes the term 'child' in line with the 1996 
Hague Child Protection Convention and the 2000 Hague Convention on the Protection 
of Vulnerable Adults. According to Article 2(2) no. 6 of the Recast, any person below 
the age of 18 years is considered a 'child'. The Recast also refers to legal sources that 
are common to the Member States and could serve as guidelines for interpreting the 
notion of the child's best interest: Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
Furthermore, the Brussels II-ter Regulation emphasizes the principle of the best 
interests of the child in new situations compared to the current Regulation. For 
instance, the Recast refers to the best interests of the child as a guideline for courts to 
decide whether to refer the parties to mediation or other ADR mechanisms (Art. 35). 
However, this provision has been drafted with caution on when and how courts shall 
consider mediation. This cautious approach is due to the fact that Article 35 applies to 
child abduction proceedings where the use of mediation is very controversial. 
Another problematic issue linked to the best interests of the child is the hearing of the 
child. Notably, the National Exchange Seminars have highlighted the diverging 
national procedures on when and how a child should be heard. The Recast tries to 
address this inhomogeneous situation by introducing a general provision on 'the right 
of the child to express his or her views' (Art. 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation). The 
current Regulation does not contain such a general rule on the hearing of the child. 
Consequently, Member States rely heavily on their national standards when deciding 
on whether refusing the enforcement of a decision. Against this backdrop, the 
introduction of a harmonized provision proved to be difficult under various 
perspectives. For instance, such a rule needed to be broad enough to allow for a case 
by case approach. Finally, the Council adopted the wording of the new Article 21 that 
explicitly refers to the lex fori. 
Contrary to many national provisions, Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation does not 
entail a strict age limit, but judges are supposed to take into account the child's age 
and maturity. In addition, Article 21 states the person hearing the child does not 
necessarily have to be the judge, but also a social worker or psychologist could be 
involved instead. 
Following this new definition, the refusal grounds of the Regulation have been clarified 
to prevent the Member States from applying their own stricter standards in the 
enforcement stage. According to Article 39 of the Recast, recognition and 
enforcement of a judgment may be refused if the child has not been heard in line with 
the guidelines set out in Article 21.  
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However, the duty to hear the child is not absolute. If the proceedings only concern 
the property of the child or if the case is particularly urgent, it will not be necessary to 
hear the child's views (Art. 39(2) Brussels II-ter Regulation). 
b) The procedural regime on cross-border child abduction 
The second area tackled in the presentation concerns the European and international 
system for cross-border child abduction proceedings. A significant problem 
highlighted in the National Exchange Seminars is the excessive use of the grounds for 
refusing the return of the child, such as Article 13(1) (b) of the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention. This provision permits to refuse the return of the child if this 
return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the 
child in an intolerable situation. In addition, the National Exchange Seminars have 
highlighted an inconsistent application of Article 11(4) Brussels II-bis Regulation. This 
provision prevents courts from refusing the return of a child if 'adequate 
arrangements' can guarantee the protection of the child in the State of origin. Another 
major problem is the excessive length and costliness of child return proceedings. 
Regarding the current Article 11(4) Brussels II-bis Regulation, the Recast clarifies how 
the court of enforcement shall assess if adequate measures taken in the Member 
State of origin are enough to protect the child after its return. According to Article 27 
Brussels II-ter Regulation, the court in the Member State of enforcement shall mainly 
rely on the parties' evidence. Also, it may directly communicate with the courts of the 
State of origin to inquire about such measures. 
Furthermore, the Recast clarifies certain aspects concerning the length of 
proceedings and the autonomous deadlines under the Regulation. Article 24 Brussels 
II-ter Regulation states that the six weeks period to render a decision applies in each 
instance, and Article 28 determines an additional six weeks period for the 
enforcement procedure. However, the final version of the Recast is less far-reaching 
than the proposals made by the European Commission to avoid extremely long 
proceedings. The Commission suggested obliging the Member States to concentrate 
jurisdiction in child abduction cases in a limited number of courts and to limit the 
number of appeals against a return order to one. The Council did not adopt these 
proposals but inserted references to them in the Recitals, which invite the Member 
States to implement such measures via domestic legislation. 
Regarding the enforcement procedure, the Brussels II-ter Regulation abolishes 
exequatur for all decisions on parental responsibility (Art. 34), but still differentiates 
the refusal grounds than may be invoked against 'privileged decisions' and other 
decisions. A further significant change concerns the enforcement of 'trumping 
orders'. The strict overriding mechanism (currently laid down in Art. 11(8) Brussels 
II-bis Regulation) may be reversed in exceptional cases: According to Article 56 
Brussels II-ter Regulation, the court of enforcement may suspend and, eventually, 
refuse the implementation of the 'trumping order' if the circumstances have changed 
after this order was issued in the Member State of origin and if the enforcement would 
now endanger the child in question. However, the court of enforcement cannot 
automatically refuse the enforcement but shall first consider any 'appropriate step'. 
Admittedly, the latter criterion is relatively vague. 
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c) Cooperation between Central Authorities and courts 
The combined European and international system on cross-border child abduction 
proceedings relies heavily on the collaboration between Central Authorities. However, 
the National Exchange Seminars showed that this cooperation is complicated and 
insufficient in practice. The Brussels II-ter Regulation tries to tackle this issue by 
introducing more detailed rules on the specific tasks of the Central Authorities, 
designating the Authorities that have to provide for information, and specifying how 
this information shall circulate. 
Furthermore, the National Exchange Seminars shed light on the practical relevance of 
other cooperation mechanisms that directly involve the judges concerned. These 
'tools', which are also emphasized in the Recast and its Recitals, are the European 
Judicial Network, the International Hague Network of Judges, and the Evidence 
Regulation25.  
Another major issue worth mentioning in the cooperation between Central Authorities 
is the protection of personal data. The Recast addresses the need for such protection 
by implementing specific requirements set out by the GDPR for the transmission and 
processing of personal data (Art. 88 Brussels II-ter Regulation). 
3. The rules on parental responsibility in the Brussels II-ter Regulation 
The second presentation aimed at a more in-depth evaluation of the Brussels II-ter 
Regulation in the area of parental responsibility. This intervention did not focus on a 
comparison between the proposal of the European Commission and the final text 
published in the Official Journal, as the outcome of negotiations is of paramount 
importance for practitioners and not the negotiations as such. Therefore, the 
provisions of the Recast voted by the Council should be analyzed to the extent they 
enhance the practical application of the Regulation. Interestingly, the survey 
conducted within the EUFams II Project revealed that the EU instrument on family law 
that is best known among professionals is, indeed, the Brussels II-bis Regulation.26 By 
changing the Regulation, this relatively high degree of familiarity will be set back. It 
remains to be seen how the new rules will be understood and applied by practitioners. 
a) Enforcement of decisions in matters of parental responsibility 
Particular regard was given to the new Chapter 4 Section 3 in the Brussels II-ter 
Regulation on 'common provisions on enforcement'. The speaker welcomed these 
new provisions as a step in the right direction to better regulate the enforcement 
procedure for decisions on parental responsibility after the abolition of exequatur 
(Art. 34 Brussels II-ter Regulation). Harmonizing the enforcement procedure means 
to directly interfere with the administration of justice of the Member States, which the 
latter cautiously accepted.  
 
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the 
Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters, OJ L 174, 27.6.2001, p. 1 et 
seq. 
26 Lobach/Rapp, An Empirical Study on European Family and Succession Law: Report on the 
Questionnaire conducted within the framework of the EUFams II project (2019), p. 16, available at: 
http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-
Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=2. 
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However, among these new rules on enforcement, the practical application of the 
grounds for refusal and suspension of enforcement (Art. 56) and in particular of 
Article 56(6) Brussels II-ter Regulation raises several questions. On the one hand, 
these refusal grounds are sensible insofar as a court will never proceed to enforce a 
decision if there is a real risk of physical or psychological harm for the child. On the 
other hand, the European legislator tried to limit the use of these refusal grounds to 
exceptional cases by demanding significant changes in the circumstances or a new 
temporary element, but these limits may not be a sufficient barrier.  
The problematic effect of these new refusal grounds is that they confer further 
'ammunition' to parents to extend the litigation to the enforcement stage of child 
abduction proceedings. Consequently, the enforcement procedure might become 
even less efficient than under the current Regulation. Return proceedings may end up 
being limitless without solving the actual child abduction. 
b) 'Agreements' on parental responsibility 
Another issue highlighted in the presentation concerns Chapter 4 of the Recast 
dealing with 'authentic instruments and agreements' (Art. 64 et seq.). Addressing 
such family law agreements involving children in the new Regulation was welcomed 
as a positive development. Notably, the grounds for refusing the recognition of 
agreements and authentic instruments address specifically the need to hear the child. 
At the internal level, there is often no explicit mechanism or guarantee that the child is 
being heard during the negotiations of the agreement. In light of the new refusal 
ground based on the hearing of the child (Art. 68(3) Brussels II-ter Regulation), the 
national practice of not hearing the child's views needs to be revised. 
Furthermore, Chapter 4 leads to a methodological change insofar as the parties can 
control the substantive law applicable to the out-of-court agreement. This aspect, as 
well as the mechanism of reviewing the jurisdiction, raises several open questions.  
c) The right of the child to be heard 
Concerning the revised provision on the right of the child to be heard (Art. 21 Brussels 
II-ter Regulation), it is indeed remarkable that the Member States have accepted to 
negotiate a harmonized provision. However, the final wording of this rule does not 
entail any significant changes except for the references to the case-law of the CJEU. If 
a court decides to hear a child, it must offer the child an adequate opportunity to 
express its views and has to take into account the opinions expressed by the child.27  
An additional clear message of Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation is that all methods 
used in the Member States for the hearing of the child must be considered equivalent 
and adequate in light of the principle of mutual trust. However, it may be questioned if 
this attitude of equivalence applies, indeed, to all methods. 
d) Party autonomy in matters of parental responsibility 
The new provision on choice-of-court agreements (Art. 10 Brussels II-ter Regulation) 
was presented as a significant development. Notably, parties may conclude a choice-
of-court agreement at any time before a dispute arises, which is currently not 
 
27 CJEU, Judgment of 22.12.2010, Zarraga v Pelz, C-491/10 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828. 
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permitted under Article 12 Brussels II-bis Regulation. However, such an ex-ante-
agreement does not confer exclusive jurisdiction but only a concurrent jurisdiction: 
Article 10(4) Brussels II-ter Regulation states that only the prorogation agreed upon in 
the course of proceedings shall confer exclusive jurisdiction. This differentiation is 
problematic as it creates a race to the courthouse. For instance, one parent might 
seize the court that was chosen before the proceedings started, and the other parent 
might apply to another court according to the default rule. In this regard, the 
possibility to select the competent court beforehand may only be useful if the parties 
agree and will not enter into conflict at a later stage. However, if parties agree in any 
event, there is likely no need to seize a court to solve their case. Therefore, it would 
have been more important to guarantee the validity of an ex ante-agreement in cases 
where the parties disagree and bring their case to court. 
e) The role of the Recitals 
The presentation also addressed a question that applies to EU Regulations in general, 
namely, the lack of certainty attached to Recitals and their value. This open question 
is particularly crucial in the Brussels II-ter Regulation that comprises a total of 98 
Recitals. These Recitals are not only remarkably long but also increasingly 
complicated.  
Notably, the Recitals of the Brussels II-ter Regulation seem to address different target 
groups. They reach out to judges who interpret the Regulation but also address 
lawyers to teach them how to use the Regulation. For instance, Recital 43 proposes 
lawyers to opt for a choice-of-court agreement to obtain the homologation of 
agreements reached via mediation in child abduction cases. The Recitals also refer to 
the governments of the Member States with regard to national implementation laws. 
Also, the Recitals address the delegates involved in the negotiations and whose 
proposals were not accepted. This mixture is hard to understand and leaves the exact 
scope and substance of the Recitals unclear. 
4. Critical analysis of selected issues in the open discussion   
a) The efficiency and length of enforcement proceedings 
Following the two presentations concerning the EU regime on parental responsibility, 
the floor was given to the audience for an open discussion. The first issue addressed 
in the discourse concerned the overall efficiency of enforcement proceedings under 
the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation. 
From a general point of view, it was criticized that the Recast does not extend the 
instructions on expeditious proceedings (Art. 24 Brussels II-ter Regulation) to the 
enforcement stage of child abduction cases. This shortcoming is particularly regretful 
as timing is critical in child abduction cases: The more time elapses, the more stable 
the presence of the child becomes in the state of abduction. As a result, the court 
may no longer consider the return to be in the best interest of the child and may deny 
the request in light of Article 13(1) (b) 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention.  
Regarding the differentiation between 'privileged' decisions and other decisions on 
parental responsibility, it was criticized that the Recast does not provide better 
guidance for practitioners. Even if the Recast reduces this differentiation between 
decisions by abolishing exequatur in toto, it still follows a double-track system with 
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regard to the refusal grounds. Practitioners may have difficulties in applying these 
different rules.    
Special attention was drawn to the specific ground for suspending and refusing the 
enforcement of a return order according to Article 56 Brussels II-ter Regulation. 
Notably, participants discussed to what extent this new provision will change the 
system under the current Article 11 Brussels II-bis Regulation. The case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 8 ECHR28 opens the possibility for 
courts to exercise discretion to protect the best interests of the child. In light of the 
new Article 56, the courts of the Member States will have to take into account this 
margin of discretion which does not comply with the current mechanism. Instead, the 
new refusal grounds seem to lead back to the mechanism under Article 13(1)(b) of 
the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Regulation, which might become a strong incentive 
for parents to litigate even further. Among others, the Recitals of the Brussels II-ter 
Regulation explicitly encourage the involvement of social workers and child 
psychologists. These professionals may be involved to assess if the return would 
endanger the child's physical and psychological well-being. Such measures might, 
however, create additional avenues for litigation and further extend the return 
proceedings. This result contradicts the aim of the Brussels II-bis Regime to ensure a 
quick return of the child.  
The lengthiness of return proceedings does not only increase the probability of 
refusing the return of the child but also creates high costs for the parties involved. 
According to Article 26 and Article 42 of the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, 
a Member State may not assume these costs. This possibility to reserve the costs of 
legal assistance in return proceedings can be a significant hurdle for the parties 
concerned. Therefore, some participants recommended revising this provision, 
especially with regard to mediation, which is often particularly expensive. 
The discussions with the audience also addressed the concentration of jurisdiction in 
cross-border parental responsibility cases, which had been proposed by the European 
Commission as a mechanism to avoid overly lengthy proceedings. Some participants 
welcomed this proposal, but others highlighted that the Member States follow different 
approaches to the concentration of jurisdiction in general. While some Member States 
traditionally follow this mechanism in their domestic law (for instance, Germany), this 
is not the case in other Member States that were not ready to accept significant 
interferences with their national procedural law.  
In the final version of the Recast, the only left-overs of these additional proposals are 
the Recitals, which appeal to the Member States to consider such mechanisms in 
their domestic legislation. The Recitals also suggest providing enough funding for 
Central Authorities, as their proper functionality and efficiency may have a direct effect 
on the duration of the proceedings. 
b) The new provision on the hearing of the child 
Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation on the 'right of the child to be heard' raised 
multiple questions in the discussion. First of all, the nature of the explicit 
 
28 See, for instance, the case of X v. Latvia (27853/09), Judgment of 26.11.2013, decided by the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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reference to domestic law and the delimitation between the harmonized criteria 
and national standards remain unclear. The CJEU might apply this provision in line 
with the interpretation of public policy in the Krombach case.29 In this judgment, 
the Court held that, if the public policy-clause refers to national law, this reference 
is subject to limits imposed by EU law, including the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The same approach could apply to Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation. 
Several participants highlighted the crucial role of the CJEU in shaping the obligation 
to hear the child and providing better guidance on its interpretation. 
In the final version of Article 21, more importance was given to the principle of 
equivalence than to harmonization of detailed requirements for the hearing of the 
child. National practices vary heavily in this regard. In Spain and Italy, for instance, 
most authorities do not involve children under the age of 12. This practice may not be 
in line with Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation that deliberately avoids defining a 
specific minimum age to hear the child. The PETI Committee had suggested 
introducing a respective age limit,30 but the European Parliament did not adopt this 
proposal.31 Notably, defining a strict minimum age in the Brussels II-ter Regulation 
would have been contrary to Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, which does not differentiate between children of a certain age concerning the 
right to be heard.  
From a more general point of view, some participants argued that the hearing of the 
child is more important if the parents disagree on matters of parental responsibility, 
whereas in a consensual setting, such as in out-of-court divorces, there is no need to 
involve the child in the proceeding. In fact, the analysis of case law shows that 
children are heard only in a limited number of cases. For instance, it is a common 
practice in Italy to refrain from hearing the child in judicial mutual consent divorces 
and out-of-court divorces. 
Practitioners in the audience discussed to what extent Article 21 Brussels II-ter 
Regulation will have an impact on such national practices. Some participants argued 
that Article 21 is a reasonable compromise that allows respecting the rights of the 
child in accordance with national substantive law and procedural law. Contrary to the 
rule proposed by the European Commission,32 the final provision does not stipulate a 
strict obligation to hear every child. This ratio is also reflected in the title of Article 21, 
which refers to the right of the child to express his or her opinion, and not to an 
obligation for courts. 
Consequently, refusing to hear the child in compliance with national procedures 
would not trigger the refusal ground of Article 39(2) Brussels II-ter Regulation. Italian 
 
29 CJEU, judgment of 28.3.2000, Krombach v Bamberski, C-7/98, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164. 
30 See the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the 
matters of parental responsibility,  and on international child abduction (recast), OJ C 125, 21.4.2017, 
p. 50. 
31 See the proposed amendments adopted by the Parliament concerning Art. 20 of the Recast 
Proposal: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0017_EN.html?redirect.  
32 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast), COM(2016) 411 final, p. 42. 
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judgments on mutual consent divorces rendered under Italian law without the child 
being heard by the judge should, therefore, be recognized and enforced in the EU 
under the Brussels II-ter Regulation. The same question arises with regard to out-of-
court divorces involving matters of parental responsibility. Article 68(3) Brussels II-ter 
Regulation permits to refuse the recognition and enforcement of such agreements if 
the child has not had an opportunity to express his/her views in accordance with 
Article 21. This refusal ground might stop the circulation of out-of-court divorces 
drawn up under Italian law if this refusal ground is interpreted in a strict sense. While 
courts may involve a psychologist or social services to hear the child, lawyers are not 
able to do so as they are not professionals trained for this task. However, this lack of 
training may also apply to judges involved in a judicial divorce. By way of example, a 
German practitioner referred to a case that does not represent a 'best practice': The 
judge heard the child for one hour and asked the latter ninety questions. 
Other participants argued that the above-mentioned practice in Italy is not at all in line 
with the requirements of Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation. This provision does not 
differentiate between contentious and mutual consent divorces, and the child has to 
be involved in either situation. Italian courts and practitioners should, therefore, find a 
workable solution to include children in mutual consent divorces, as the conclusion of 
an agreement does not necessarily imply that the best interests of the child have been 
taken into account. 
However, other participants held that Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation does not 
constitute a significant change, as Article 24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
Charter and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child have already been applied 
under the current Regulation to protect the rights of the child in proceedings. 
Therefore, Article 21 is merely a 'reminder' addressed to all stakeholders to 
mainstream the idea of hearing the child in the proceedings. At the same time, 
Article 21 respects the fact the Member States attach different values to the hearing of 
the child. Notably, this provision does not require that a judge hears the child, but that 
somebody has to. For instance, if the judge asks the parents whether they have 
involved the child in their decision or listened to it and if the judge considers this 
circumstance in the judgment, then the child has been 'heard'.  
Furthermore, the relevance of a declaration of the child made before a court in 
another Member State was discussed. For instance, in a recent decision of the Italian 
Court of Cassation,33 the Italian Court of First Instance decided not to hear a child that 
had already been heard by courts in Monaco. The Court of Cassation overruled this 
decision, arguing that the environment in which the child had been heard in Monaco 
was too biased against the father. In such cases, it remains unclear whether 
declarations made before courts in another Member State will be sufficient to comply 
with the requirements of Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation, and to what extent the 
environment in which the child was heard in that other Member State plays a decisive 
role. Notably, a declaration of the child made a long time ago might not correspond to 
the child's present conditions, as circumstances concerning children usually evolve 
 
33 Corte di Cassazione, 11.06.2019, 15728, The judgment is available in the EUFams II database as 
ITT20190611. 
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very quickly. Therefore, a court should not rely exclusively on such an 'outdated' 
statement made in another Member State.  
To conclude, the discussion highlighted that, notwithstanding the difficulties of dealing 
with different national approaches, the hearing of the child is a fundamental right. It is 
subject to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which should be interpreted uniformly. 
This framework also applies to Article 21 Brussels II-ter Regulation that should 
regulate more than just referring to national systems.  
c) Mediation 
The Brussels II-ter Regulation addresses mediation and other ADR mechanisms 
specifically in the context of child abduction proceedings (Art. 35) and, more 
generally, invites parents and other parties to try mediation. In light of this mediation-
friendly yet cautious approach of the Recast, the discussion during the International 
Exchange Seminar evolved around practical problems in the use of ADR in cross-
border proceedings concerning children. First of all, practitioners in the audience 
were aware of the delicate situation at stake: On the one hand, judges try to invite 
parties, often via their lawyers, to attempt mediation. Lawyers, however, have to deal 
with their clients who are fighting over the child and who started judicial proceedings 
precisely because it was difficult to reach an agreement out of court. 
Furthermore, a fundamental problem is the availability of specialized mediators, in 
particular concerning child abduction cases. The skills of the mediator are crucial, as 
mediation is only as effective as the mediator is qualified. In this regard, the website 
'crossbordermediator.eu' was presented, which provides a list of mediators 
specifically trained to deal with cross-border family conflicts, including international 
child abduction.  
d) Jurisdiction for incidental questions and the case-law of the CJEU 
Special attention was drawn to Article 16 Brussels II-ter Regulation on the jurisdiction 
for incidental questions. This new provision states that, if the outcome of proceedings 
in a matter falling outside of the scope of the Regulation depends on the 
determination of an incidental question relating to parental responsibility, the court 
where these main proceedings are pending is competent to rule on that incidental 
question for the purposes of those proceedings, even if it does not have jurisdiction 
under the Regulation. 
The audience discussed to what extent this new jurisdiction rule affects the case-law 
of the CJEU.34 The CJEU has, so far, argued that questions concerning parental 
responsibility arising in other (primary) proceedings could not be qualified as 
preliminary, but as main questions. The CJEU thus tried to establish the seized court's 
competence for these questions under the general jurisdiction heads of the Brussels 
II-bis Regulation, notably by affirming the validity of a choice-of-court agreement.35 
Some participants argued that Article 16 Brussels II-ter Regulation will reverse this 
approach by treating such questions as 'incidental'. This interpretation is supported 
 
34 For instance, see CJEU, judgment of 19.4.2018, Saponaro et al., C-565/15, ECLI:EU:C:2018:265; 
CJEU, judgment of 6.10.2015, Matoušková, C-404/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:653. 
35 CJEU, judgment of 19.4.2018, Saponaro et al., C-565/15, ECLI:EU:C:2018:265. 
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by the recitals 32 and 33 of the Regulation that reflect situations the CJEU dealt with 
in its case-law, but which now fall under Article 16, such as the judicial approval of 
acts concerning the assets of minors or the rejection of inheritance. 
e) Additional open questions and reform proposals 
After many years of applying the return mechanism under the Brussels II-bis Regime, 
it has become evident that this mechanism has its limits. At the outset, the return 
mechanism was designed to speed up the proceedings and to have children returned 
as quickly as possible. However, the practical application of the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation shows that this aim has only been met to a limited extent. In this regard, 
the Brussels II-ter Regulation will presumably be of little help, as it provides parents 
with too much 'ammunition' to continue litigating. 
In particular, the discussion with the audience addressed the differences in national 
legislation concerning relocation orders. In some Member States, the caregiver is not 
entitled to obtain such an order even for legitimate reasons. Consequently, if the 
caregiver decides unilaterally to move away with the child, this parent would commit 
child abduction, whereas the other parent has multiple legal 'weapons' to counteract 
the relocation under the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation.  
Also, the current regime does not sufficiently take into account the rise of joint 
parental custody, which enables parents to 'share' the child by rotating the care 
every other week. Joint custody hinders each parent from moving away with the child, 
as this act would amount to child abduction.  
The discussion terminated with the conclusion that the current child abduction regime 
needs a recommitment to return the child immediately and to shift other substantive 
purposes to a later step. The European legislator should rethink these issues for future 
reforms. 
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C. 'BREXIT' AHEAD: IMPACTS ON EUROPEAN FAMILY LAW36 
Shortly after the International Exchange Seminar, the European Council adopted a 
decision to delay Brexit until 31 January 2020 to allow more time for the withdrawal 
agreement to be ratified.37 Participants from the UK felt reassured about this extension 
and reiterated the need for legal certainty to protect international families and their 
rights after Brexit. 
Other participants were not as confident whether a withdrawal agreement will be 
reached or not. However, they concluded that both scenarios would entail advantages 
and disadvantages concerning cross-border family matters. With or without a 'deal' 
between the EU and the UK, international family law will remain a complex legal 
framework. 
A benefit of the withdrawal agreement would be to set up a transitional period during 
which the existing European instruments continue to apply. Thus, the legal landscape 
that remains after the transitional period seems more unclear. 
This uncertainty concerning the applicable legal regime is particularly problematic for 
child abduction cases. On the one hand, the system set up by the 1980 Hague Child 
Abduction Convention and the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention is not 
affected by Brexit and will continue to apply in the UK. On the other hand, these 
instruments do not establish an equally comprehensive framework as the Brussels II-
bis Regulation does. At present, it is unlikely that the UK will enact an equivalent to 
the Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation unilaterally, also in a 'no deal'-scenario. However, 
even if there is no direct continuity with the EU instruments on family law, the 
Brussels II-bis Regime will continue to influence courts in the UK. They have applied 
the Brussels II-bis Regulation for many years, and the respective case-law will likely 
be taken into consideration further on. 
Apart from the child abduction regime, further crucial post-Brexit questions on cross-
border family matters are currently debated in the UK. Notably, particular attention is 
given to the rules on the transfer of jurisdiction (Art. 15 Brussels II-bis Regulation and, 
respectively, Art. 12 and Art. 13 Brussels II-ter Regulation) and lis pendens (Art. 19 
Brussels II-bis Regulation and, respectively, Art. 20 Brussels II-ter Regulation).  
According to a practitioner from the UK, it would be necessary to ensure effective 
national procedural rules on cross-border family matters for post-Brexit times. Notably, 
professionals and scholars in the UK have recently been debating the virtues of a 
discretionary mechanism, such as forum non conveniens, in contrast to the 
'European' lis pendens-rule of the Brussels II-bis Regulation. Even if the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens was applied historically before UK courts, practitioners are now 
used to applying the lis pendens-principle instead.  
 
36 This Chapter was written by Dr. Marlene Brosch, Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law 
Luxembourg. 
37 See the official press release of 29th October 2019 of the European Council, 'Brexit: European 
Council adopts decision to extend the period under Article 50', available at: 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/10/29/brexit-european-council-adopts-
decision-to-extend-the-period-under-article-50/#.  
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In this regard, it is interesting to note how the point of view of British scholars and 
practitioners changed on lis pendens and the possibility to transfer the jurisdiction. 
Unlike the negotiations of the Brussels II-bis Regulation, they are now well aware of 
the disadvantages of the discretionary approach of forum non conveniens, such as 
high costs and the duration of proceedings. UK professionals are, therefore, urging 
the legislators to consider the negative implications of a more discretionary rule 
compared to the European regime that is currently (still) in place.  
The Brexit-panel of the International Exchange Seminar Seminar was closed with a 
word of hope by a scholar from the other side of the Channel. If the UK reaches a 
withdrawal agreement, it might be willing and able to join the system set up by the 
Brussels II-bis/-ter Regulation at a later stage. 
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D. THE RECENTLY ESTABLISHED ENHANCED COOPERATION IN MATRIMONIAL 
PROPERTY REGIMES AND PROPERTY REGIMES FOR REGISTRED PARTNERSHIPS: 
INNOVATIONS AND PITFALLS38 
I. A FOREWORD 
The first panel of the afternoon focused on the recently established enhanced 
cooperation in matrimonial property regimes and property regimes for registered 
partnerships. After numerous years of reflections and negotiations, Regulation (EU) 
2016/110339 and Regulation (EU) 2016/110440 were adopted on 24 June 2016 on the 
basis of Article 81(3) TFEU: They entered into force on 28 July 2016, and became 
applicable as of 29 January 2019. In accordance with Article 20 TEU and Title 
III TFEU, these Regulations implement enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of, respectively, matrimonial property regimes and the property consequences 
of registered partnerships.41  
The purpose of these Regulations is threefold: notably, these Regulations (i) clarify 
which national court has jurisdiction to assist couples manage their property or 
distribute it between them in case of divorce, separation or death; (ii) shed the light on 
which national law governs the matters that fall within their scope of application; and 
(iii) simplify the recognition and enforcement in one Member State of a judgment 
given in another Member State on questions of property regimes of international 
couples.  
At present, 18 Member States participate in the enhanced cooperation established 
with these Regulations. They are Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, and Sweden. Estonia has also expressed its 
interest in taking part in the cooperation.42 
The adoption of Regulations 1103 and 1104 of 2016 marks a significant – albeit 
partial, due to the limited territorial scope of their application – step forth in the 
architecture of EU private international and procedural law in family matters, and it 
contributes to the European Union’s endeavour and commitment to ensure 
consistency in the treatment of cross-border family law matters within the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.  
 
38 This Chapter was written by Dr. Cristina M. Mariottini, Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law 
Luxembourg. 
39 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of 
matrimonial property regimes, OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 1–29. 
40 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1104 of 24 June 2016 implementing enhanced cooperation in the 
area of jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of the 
property consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 183, 8.7.2016, p. 30–56. 
41 See Council Decision (EU) 2016/954 of 9 June 2016 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of 
international couples, covering both matters of matrimonial property regimes and the property 
consequences of registered partnerships, OJ L 159, 16.6.2016, p. 16–18. 
42 See, in particular, Art. 331 TFEU. 
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However, the Regulations on property regimes of international couples are 
characterised by a high degree of complexity and, as transpired from the discussions 
held within the panel, pending questions arise, in particular, from the coordination of 
these Regulations as between themselves, from their coordination with the Brussels II-
bis (and, soon, Brussels II-ter) Regulation, and from their coordination with the 
Succession Regulation. 
II. THE PROPERTY REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COUPLES: A FIRST ASSESSMENT. 
INCREASED CERTAINTY, BUT ADDITIONAL LACK OF COORDINATION IN THE AREA OF 
EU FAMILY LAW 
The first presentation delivered within the panel shed the light on the pending and 
problematic issues discernible in the context of the EU Regulations on the property 
regime of international couples.  
As shown in the course of the National Exchange Seminars hosted locally by the 
Project Partners, there is general consensus that the Regulations provide an 
improvement vis-à-vis legal certainty compared to the previous situation, which was 
characterised by a tangle of different national rules. However, a number of sources of 
uncertainty were also identified.  
As the first critical assessment offered in the panel portrayed, among the problematic 
issues are: matters of scope and characterisation (infra, para. 1); questions of 
coordination between rules on jurisdiction over property claims and succession or 
divorce (or dissolution of the registered partnership) (infra, para. 2); questions related 
to the law that governs the property regime of the international couples (infra, para. 3); 
and the paramount importance of education and training to foster predictability and 
legal certainty (infra, para. 4). 
1. Scope and characterisation 
a) Lack of definition of the term ‘marriage’ in the Regulation on Matrimonial 
Property Regimes 
The presentation started by highlighting the lack of an autonomous definition of the 
term ‘marriage’ in the Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes. In fact, while 
Article 3(1)(a) of the Regulation on Property Consequences of Registered Partnerships 
provides an autonomous definition of ‘registered partnership’ for the purposes of the 
Regulation, the Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes does not contain any 
binding definition of the term ‘marriage’.  
As already pointed out with respect to the Brussels II-bis Regulation, due to the lack of 
such definition the Regulation on Matrimonial Property Regimes does not apply in a 
consistent manner: Concerns in this respect arise, of course, vis-à-vis the 
characterisation of same-sex marriages, to the detriment of uniform interpretation and 
application of the Regulation.43 However, a similar concern was raised also with 
regards to the characterisation of the French ‘avantages matrimoniaux’. 
During the debate, it was remarked that the definition of the term ‘marriage’ actually 
amounts to a preliminary question on the validity of a marriage: As such, it is a private 
 
43 See supra at Chapter B. 
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international law question, which needs to be looked at from the perspective of the 
forum. The question of the validity of a marriage and of the legal consequences of a 
marriage are in given State, whether same-sex or not, is therefore to be solved by 
giving application to the private international law of the Member State.  
In this framework, it is of note that the Regulation adopts gender-neutral forms and, in 
particular, it employs the term ‘party’. It follows that the gender-neutral forms 
accommodate the instance where – as is the case under the laws of Belgium, The 
Netherlands and Sweden – same-sex marriage is construed as falling within the scope 
of the Matrimonial Property Regulation (as well as within the scope of the Brussels II-
bis Regulation). However, while this feature indicates flexibility as to the inclusion of 
same-sex marriage in the scope of the Regulation, it does not offer a permanent and 
uniform solution to the ambiguity of the Regulation in this respect.  
As concerns the definition of ‘marriage’, the Regulation on Matrimonial Property 
Regimes does provide an indication to the interpreter in the part where it leaves, at 
Recital 17, ‘marriage’ to be ‘defined by the national laws of the Member States’. 
However, the question arises as to which national law is to decide what is to be 
construed as ‘marriage’.  
This question forms the object of a wide and active academic debate. While some 
scholars refer, for this purpose, to the law according to which the supposed marriage 
was concluded, a majority opinion favours the application of the lex fori. In this 
respect, however, the invited expert objected to both positions and observed that this 
is a matter left to national law to be identified on the basis of the private international 
law rules of the forum.  
In favour of the possibility of subjecting this issue to the lex fori, it is commonly also 
maintained that applying the lex fori to matters as sensitive as those falling within the 
scope of the Regulation prevents recourse to the public policy exception to refuse 
application to a foreign law, to the benefit of a smooth and less conflictual 
administration of justice. However, as the speaker observed, recourse to public policy 
should necessarily not be identified as a problem per se. To the contrary, in an area 
that is progressively undergoing major substantive changes such as the one 
addressing the definition of marriage, allowing courts to be confronted with the 
possibility of applying foreign laws that provide in a manner that is visibly different 
than the lex fori may actually contribute – thanks to the courts’ process of 
hermeneutical revision – towards a narrower understanding of the public policy 
exception in this area of the law and towards the approximation of the substantive 
laws of the Member States. 
Finally, it is of note that the CJEU has influenced private international law through the 
notion of free movement and of EU citizenship. The Court could rule on whether the 
Member States are required to recognise a foreign same-sex marriage based on the 
free movement principle. This would amount to the extension of the Polbud 
judgment44 where the Court mandated the obligation to recognise the free movement 
principle for residence purposes. While this step has not been taken yet, free 
movement and EU citizenship seem to be the common grounds for the recognition of 
 
44 CJEU, Judgment of 25.10.2017, Polbud, C-106/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:804. 
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same-sex marriage. In this regard, however, a warning was made to underscore that 
the CJEU may adopt different approaches under the different Regulations. For 
instance, when in the OL v PQ judgment45 the CJEU required physical presence for 
the establishment of the habitual residence, it only required it for children: Habitual 
residence for matter of property regimes of international couples might be considered 
differently, as is also the case with respect to the Succession Regulation.  
b) Conversion of a same-sex registered partnership into marriage: ambiguities and 
risks  
An additional question pertaining to characterisation arises in the context of the 
possibility to convert a same-sex registered partnership into a marriage. This is 
possible, for instance, in Belgium, in accordance with the Law of 17 May 2013,46 
which opened marriage to same-sex couples. Unlike the case of Article 32-bis of the 
Italian Private International Law Act (which mandates that same-sex marriages 
concluded abroad by Italian nationals produce the effects in Italy of a registered 
partnership),47 the Belgian Civil Code upgrades into a marriage a registered 
partnership concluded in another Member State. In doing so, the authorities will look 
at the content of the civil partnership, rather than at its name: Provided such content 
meets that of a marriage, the ensuing relationship will be characterised as ‘marriage’.  
During the debate, it was objected that the possibility of a default upgrade of a 
registered partnership into marriage which might result in forcing somebody in a 
marriage when they only wanted to be part of a registered partnership. In its reply, the 
invited expert explained that the rationale of the Belgian rule lies in the fact that the 
Belgian law on marriage is more advantageous for the parties compared to the law on 
registered partnerships: In the intentions of the Belgian legislator, if the content of the 
arrangement is the same as the marriage, then the relationship will be characterised 
as marriage to allow the parties to benefit from the more advantageous regulation 
offered by the law on marriage. 
Similarly, since 2004 in Scotland same-sex couple can register for civil partnership 
and, since 2014, a couple can enter a same-sex marriage. The legislation allows a 
couple to upgrade that civil partnership into a marriage. However, by quirk of 
domestic law, there is a backdating mechanism that has the effect of date the 
marriage as far back as the time the partnership was concluded. One can wonder how 
the Regulations can accommodate this. The first common habitual residence is no 
longer from the moment the marriage is upgraded, from the time the partnership 
started. This is a clear source of uncertainty. 
Overall, the ‘upgrade’ of the relationship is not without risk for the parties. On the one 
hand, the question remains pending as to whether, as a result of such conversion, the 
relationship transitions from being regulated by the Regulation on Property 
Consequences of Registered Partnerships to the one on Matrimonial Property 
Regimes. On the other hand, a change in the applicable regime may shift the 
 
45 CJEU, Judgment of 8.06.2017, OL v PQ, C- 111/17 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2017:436. 
46 Loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même sexe, JORF 
n°0114 du 18 mai 2013 p. 8253. 
47 Law No 218 of 31 May 1995 and subsequent amendments.  
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applicable law to the law of a State which does not recognize same-sex marriages and, 
consequently, might not provide for claims concerning the property of the partners. As 
the speaker emphasized, in this respect it is of paramount importance that the parties 
be aware of this possibility and be placed in a position where they can make an 
informed decision, especially if the law applied to their newly converted same-sex 
marriage does not allow for same-sex marriage and for claims based on that marriage.  
c) Between property and succession matters: Characterisation in the aftermath of 
the Mahnkopf decision 
A significant open question concerning characterisation was also identified with 
respect to the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Mahnkopf 
case48 where the CJEU ruled that, in the event of the death of one of the spouses, the 
allocation of the accrued gains (in accordance with § 1371 BGB (German Civil Code)) 
is to be characterised as a succession matter and thus falls under the Succession 
Regulation.49  
The Court based its decision on the grounds that the provision is not meant to regulate 
the allocation of assets, but rather the determination of the share of the estate to be 
allocated to the surviving spouse. Moreover, Article 1(2)(d) of Regulation 2016/1103 
expressly excludes from its scope the ‘succession to the estate of a deceased spouse.  
As the presentation noted, the Court’s ruling sets itself apart from the prevailing 
opinion in Germany, which was in favour of the issue being regulated under the 
statute that governs the matrimonial property regime. However, the wording of the 
judgment – especially in the parts where it states ‘that provision does not appear to 
have as its main purpose the allocation of assets or liquidation of the matrimonial 
property regime’50 and ‘Such a provision therefore principally concerns succession to 
the estate’51 – suggests that the Court of Justice was aware that these claims could 
serve more than one purpose, thus leaving the question partly open and generating 
still a certain degree of uncertainty.52 
2. Coordination between rules on jurisdiction over property claims and succession or 
divorce (or dissolution of the registered partnership): Perpertuatio fori vel non? 
As the presentation highlighted, while joint jurisdiction for property claims brought in 
connection with proceedings on succession or divorce (or dissolution of the registered 
partnership) (see Art. 4 and 5 of both Regulations) is to be read with favour, a 
shortcoming may be identified in the lack in the Regulations of any provision on the 
relationship between the rules on jurisdiction.  
 
48 CJEU, Judgment of 1.03.2018, Mahnkopf, C-558/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:138. 
49 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 107–134. 
50 CJEU, Judgment of 1.03.2018, Mahnkopf, C-558/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:138, para. 40 (emphasis 
added). 
51 Ibidem (emphasis added).  
52 The judgment is further discussed infra, in Chapter E, para. I.2. 
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For instance, it was observed that, if one of the spouses dies pending the divorce 
proceedings in which the property claims also were brought, it would have to be 
decided whether the seized court remains competent to decide on the property claims 
although the divorce proceedings have terminated with the death of the spouse.  
A similar coordination problem arises if property claims were brought before a court 
whose jurisdiction is based on Article 6 of the Matrimonial Property Regimes 
Regulation (‘Jurisdiction in other cases’) and the other party subsequently filed for 
divorce before a different court. In particular, assuming a court is seized under this 
provision, which allows for parties to seize a court regardless of concurring situation of 
divorce or succession, if a divorce is filed concurrently, does the court initially seized 
retain jurisdiction over the property claims?  
In each case, one would have to decide whether the court initially seised should retain 
its jurisdiction or, to the contrary, lose it to the other court that is tasked with the 
corresponding succession or divorce proceedings. The presentation remarked that, 
while the perpetuatio fori principle can assist in these cases, many scholars are not in 
favour of this approach. Either way, it was noted, this question does not benefit from a 
clear-cut response and requires clarification. 
Against this background, the invited speaker recalled that the question of perpetuatio 
fori was a subject of discussions during the negotiations for the recast of the Brussels 
II-bis Regulation. Perpetuatio fori is the principle underlying Article 8 Brussels II-bis 
Regulation in the part where the provision expressly states that the situation ‘at the 
time the court is seised’ is crucial for the purposes of establishing jurisdiction of the 
courts of a Member State over a case of parental responsibility. As a result of this 
provision and of its underlying principle, if the child relocates to another State, 
jurisdiction does not shift to the authorities of the State of the child’s new habitual 
residence: To the contrary, jurisdiction lies with the authorities of the child’s State of 
former residence. The provision therefore pins jurisdiction to the circumstances as 
they are at the time the court is seized and ignore the changes in the circumstances. 
As the invited speaker remarked, the Commission tried to repeal the provision in its 
proposal, maintaining that under the Regulation jurisdiction should change as soon as 
a child relocates.53 However, the proposal was not accepted in the final version of the 
text and the perpetuatio fori provision was retained.54 
3. Applicable law 
A significant number of open issues are pending also with respect to the question of 
applicable law: While some are inherent to the Regulations and may to some extent be 
overcome with the proper information being made available to the interested parties, 
others shed the light on ambiguities that characterise the Regulations and that may be 
 
53 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, the recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, and on international child abduction 
(recast), COM(2016) 411 final, p. 10, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0411&from=EN. 
54 Cf. Arts 7 and 8 of Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1111 of 25 June 2019 on jurisdiction, the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental 
responsibility, and on international child abduction, OJ L 178, 2.7.2019, p. 1–115. 
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solved only by means of the uniform and binding interpretation of the Regulations by 
the CJEU or with the intervention of the EU legislator. 
a) Temporal scope of the provisions on applicable law 
The presentation remarked that, pursuant to the two Regulations on property regimes 
of international couples, the provisions on applicable law only apply to spouses 
marrying or partners registering their partnership on or after 29 January 2019 entails: 
This entails that, for couples married or having registered their partnership before that 
date, the existing private international law regime continues to apply, to the detriment 
of harmonization.  
Indeed, this lack of uniformity can be overcome by means of a choice of law 
agreement entered into on or after 29 January 2019. However, at this solution 
appears inadequate to solve the problem, since it relies on information that the parties 
might not have. Once again, the importance of a proper dissemination of information 
among the interested stakeholders proves to be of major importance in this area of the 
law. 
b) Determination of the first common habitual residence after the conclusion of 
the marriage 
The presentation then proceeded to detect another source of uncertainty in Article 
26(1)(a) of the Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation in the part where – for the 
purposes of identifying the applicable law, absent a choice of law agreement – the 
provision refers to ‘the spouses' first common habitual residence after the conclusion 
of the marriage’ without actually defining the relevant point in time. The Regulation 
only states, in Recital 49, that the first habitual residence should be the one 
established during the time ‘shortly after marriage’.  
In this framework, one should be mindful that the law identified on the basis of this 
connecting factor applies retroactively: this entails that – to foster legal certainty – the 
time that elapses between the conclusion of the marriage and the establishment of the 
spouses’ first habitual residence needs to be reasonably short and contained.  
In this respect, the invited expert observed that, since the Court of Justice of the 
European Union held (in matters of parental responsibility) that there cannot be a 
habitual residence without a physical presence,55 one cannot rely on the couple’s 
intention (e.g., to start family or to have a home) for the purposes of identifying the 
place of first habitual residence.  
On a related note, in an attempt to lessen the impact of the uncertainties that 
surround the determination of the spouses’ first habitual residence, it was stated that 
the need to identify such connecting factor usually arises the moment the couple 
purchase a house, or when they own property and start litigation. Therefore, the 
question of where the spouses’ first habitual residence is located will likely arise not 
shortly after the marriage but, rather, at a later time, when the notion should be no 
longer problematic because the couple’s first habitual residence will have most likely 
been established and it will be easily identifiable. However, in this respect it was 
 
55 CJEU, Judgment of 15.02.2017, W and V v X, C‑499/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:118, para. 61; Judgment 
of 17.10.2018, UD, C-393/18 PPU, ECLI:EU:C:2018:835, para. 53. 
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objected that, in a society where mobility increases exponentially and where an 
individual may relocate multiple times in a relatively short time, identifying and 
especially proving the place of first habitual residence may prove significantly more 
complex than expected, especially if this entails going back several years in time, after 
multiple relocations.  
c) Choice of law and ‘downgrading’ of same-sex marriages into registered 
partnerships 
Some legal systems, such as Italy (see Art. 32-bis of the Italian Private International 
Law Act), provide that same-sex marriages concluded abroad by nationals produce 
the effects of a registered partnership, instead. As relayed supra, the ‘downgrading’ as 
well as the ‘upgrading’ of a relationship raises the question as to which Property 
Regimes Regulation governs the newly established relationships.56 
The uncertainty that stems from this lack of clarity brings about a threat to the 
individual rights of the couple and might catalyse a significant degree of uncertainty 
also for the third parties that entertain legal relationships with the couple. In this 
respect, Article 22(1)(a) of the Regulation on Registered Partnerships is of limited 
assistance. This provision states that ‘The partners or future partners may agree to 
designate or to change the law applicable to the property consequences of their 
registered partnership, provided that that law attaches property consequences to the 
institution of the registered partnership and that that law is one of the following: (a) the 
law of the State where the partners or future partners, or one of them, is habitually 
resident at the time the agreement is concluded’. As the speaker underscored, the 
following may occur: In accordance with the Regulation on Matrimonial Property 
Regime, an Italian couple living in France marries in France, designating French law 
as the law applicable to their marriage and requesting that their choice be recorded in 
the civil registry. The couple subsequently applies to have the marriage recorded in 
the Italian civil registry.  
Similarly to the case of an ‘upgrade’ of the relationship, the question arises as to which 
Property Regimes Regulation applies: Is it the one on Registered Partnerships, as a 
result of the ‘downgrading’ of the relationship according to Article 32-bis Italian Private 
International Law Act, or is the choice of law made under the Regulation on 
Matrimonial Property Regimes in a Member State (such as France) which allows for 
same sex-marriage to be governed by this latter Regulation?  
The complexity of the situation, however, further increases in the event that the couple 
relocates, e.g., to Luxembourg before applying for registration in Italy: Against this 
background, in fact, they would lose any possibility to invoke – in accordance with 
Article 22 – French law as the law that regulates their property regime. The 
uncertainty that ensues is to the detriment of legal certainty in the treatment of the 
couple’s rights but also in the opposability of such rights toward third parties. It is, 
therefore, deemed desirable that a clear-cut solution be provided to foster clarity and 
predictability in this regard. 
 
56 See para. 1.b in this Chapter. 
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d) The formal validity of choice of law agreements under the Matrimonial Property 
Regimes Regulation 
Some lack of clarity was also underscored with regard to the formal validity of 
agreements (Art. 23(2) Matrimonial Property Regimes Regulation) concluded by 
spouses habitually resident, in particular, in Italy: It was questioned whether the 
formal validity of such agreements is subject to the additional formal requirements for 
matrimonial property agreements laid down by domestic law, i.e. an agreement 
concluded by means of an authentic instrument in the presence of two witnesses (cf. 
Art. 162 Italian Civil Code).  
While this is the solution favoured by the majority opinion, it was noted that some 
regions in apply a land-based registration system (‘sistema tavolare’), whereby it is 
common practice to include the choice of Italian law in the purchase deed of an 
immovable property concluded by the spouses, thereby avoiding the formal 
requirements of matrimonial property agreements. 
e) Is there any room for implied choice of law agreements? 
The question whether implied choice of law is permitted under the Regulation on 
Matrimonial Property Regimes also remains open. The presentation recalled that – 
unlike the Rome I,57 Rome II58 and Succession59 Regulations – the Regulation on 
Matrimonial Property Regimes does not contain a provision on implied choice of law. 
While some argue that it should be inferred from the lack of such provision that 
implied choice of law is not allowed under the Regulation, others refer to the legislative 
history of the Regulation to suggest the opposite (the exclusion of implied choice of 
law was, in fact, initially included, however it subsequently removed from the draft).  
As the invited expert remarked, the problem arises in particular when the parties drew 
up an agreement that clearly shows that the agreement is based on one specific legal 
system, although such choice is not explicitly written in the document. In the opinion 
of the invited expert, it would be overly legalistic to maintain that the choice was not 
expressed and that the matrimonial property regime is governed by the law of the 
spouses’ first habitual residence, as opposed to the law impliedly designated by the 
parties.  
During the debate, the question was also raised whether the question of implied 
partnership amounts to a question of evidence? If this were the case, implied choices 
of law would be decided in accordance with the law of the forum. 
The question remains open and, once again, the importance of education and training 
towards, in this case, a conscious and proper use of party autonomy, is patent. 
 
57 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the 
law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), OJ L 177, 4.7.2008, p. 6–16. 
58 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the 
law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ L 199, 31.7.2007, p. 40–49. 
59 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 107–134. 
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4. Education and training 
As underlined during the presentation, the structure of the Regulations on the 
property regime of international couples is fairly convoluted and raises several 
questions: This is a problem in and of itself.  
In addition, the survey that was conducted within the EUFams II Project has shown 
that practitioners and judges are for the most part unfamiliar or little familiar with the 
Regulations: in fact, 57% of the respondents to the survey admitted to not having any 
familiarity with the instruments, as did 77% of the responding judges.60 Against this 
background, education and training are a core tool and should be pursued as a 
primary means to achieve the objective of effectiveness of the Regulations and 
harmonization in this area of the law.  
To foster legal certainty and predictability, education and training should not be 
limited to practitioners and to the judiciary: to the contrary, they should also be 
extended to citizens, who should be in the position of making informed decisions, in a 
timely manner, with respect to their property regimes.  
 
60 Lobach/Rapp, An Empirical Study on European Family and Succession Law: Report on the 
Questionnaire conducted within the framework of the EUFams II project (2019), p. 26, available at: 
http://www2.ipr.uni-heidelberg.de/eufams/index-
Dateien/microsites/download.php?art=projektbericht&id=2. 
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E. THE SUCCESSION REGULATION AND THE REGULATION ON PUBLIC DOCUMENTS: 
PRACTICAL ISSUES AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS61 
The second panel of the afternoon session covered two Regulations, namely the 
Succession Regulation62 and the Regulation on Public Documents:63 The first 
presentation began by offering a detailed overview of the core problems in the area of 
succession matters; it proceeded to review the relevant case law of the CJEU, also 
referring to national case law; it then offered a first compelling analysis as regards the 
case law made available via the Project case law database; finally, it provided a 
synopsis of the Regulation on Public Documents, which recently became applicable in 
all the Member States, emphasizing the interplay of this Regulation with the 
Regulations on family and succession law.  
The presentation was followed by the intervention of an invited expert which pursued 
two major objectives: On the one hand, it identified practical issues related to the 
Succession Regulation, extending its analysis also to the impact that the Regulation 
has in Third States and, on the other hand, it encouraged the further analysis of, in 
particular, the Succession Regulation by scholars.  
A lively debate ensued.  
Overall, the discussions held within the panel highlighted that the absence of certain 
autonomous notions and the interplay of diverging (if not mutually exclusive) national 
concepts are two core of the problems that have arisen and/or have been identified 
with respect to the interpretation and actual application of the Succession Regulation, 
to the detriment of consistency and predictability. In addition, courts and practitioners 
are faced with issues pertaining to party autonomy – which embodies the fundamental 
instrument to pursue estate planning and certainty, and should therefore be 
cherished. Finally, the coordination of the Regulation with other existing instruments – 
be it treaties or national laws – have also proven challenging. In spite of the 
hermeneutical intervention of the Court of Justice of the European Union on some 
questions, these issues remain partly unsettled and are at the core of the debate both 
in academia and in practice. 
 
61 This chapter was written by Dr. Cristina M. Mariottini, Max Planck Institute for Procedural Law 
Luxembourg. The author wishes to acknowledge Mr. Philippos Siaplaouras, Max Planck Institute for 
Procedural Law Luxembourg, for his helpful comments on previous drafts of this chapter. 
62 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 107–134. 
63 Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on 
promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public 
documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012, OJ L 200, 
26.7.2016, p. 1–136. 
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I. THE SUCCESSION REGULATION: STATE OF THE ART 
1. The core problems 
a) The notion of habitual residence 
The presentation commenced with the observation that the notion of habitual 
residence is the default rule at the very core of the Succession Regulation and it 
remarked that, in spite of such a central position in the Regulation, the Regulation 
does not provide a definition of this term, giving rise to a certain degree of uncertainty, 
including the case of negative conflicts of jurisdiction.  
A crucial role in the determination of the notion of habitual residence in accordance 
with the Succession Regulation is played by Recitals 23-24 pursuant to which, for the 
purposes of the Regulation, the determination of habitual residence is subject to a 
particularly close scrutiny and takes the form of ‘an overall assessment of the 
circumstances of the life of the deceased during the years preceding his death and at 
the time of his death, taking account of all relevant factual elements, in particular the 
duration and regularity of the deceased’s presence in the State concerned and the 
conditions and reasons for that presence’ (Recital 23). However, this general 
statement is counterbalanced by the nuances put forth at Recital 24 which add 
flexibility to the notion for those cases where determining the habitual residence of the 
deceased proves particularly complex.  
In this regard, it was noted in the debate following the presentation that the notion of 
habitual residence is not the same in accordance with every the EU Regulation in 
private international and procedural law. For example, the notion of the habitual 
residence under the Succession Regulation is not the same as the one adopted in the 
context of cases of child abduction, due to the fact that the Regulations pursue 
different objectives. For instance, the Brussels II-bis Regulation does not permit a 
change in the habitual residence of the child based on relocation: The underlying 
rationale of this rule is to be found in the goal of sanctioning any unlawful transfer of 
the child. On the contrary, pursuant to the Maintenance Regulation it is for the 
maintenance creditor to confirm the change in residence, to ensure an easier access 
to a maintenance claim.  
Ultimately, it was observed that, against this backdrop and absent a ruling by the 
Court of Justice of the European Union on this matter, the EUFams II case law 
database, as well as the analysis of the cases collected therein, will prove useful to 
properly carve out the relevant notion of habitual residence pursuant to the 
Succession Regulation and close – to the extent possible – the gap left by the absence 
of such autonomous notion.64 
b) Party autonomy and jurisdiction based on appearance 
While the Succession Regulation foresees party autonomy, such possibility is 
nevertheless not unlimited. Especially concerning choice of court agreements, the 
provisions laid down in the Regulation are complex, and sometimes hard to 
understand and to apply. For instance, as the presentation observed, Article 5 of the 
Succession Regulation puts forth an interesting paradox by calling upon the parties to 
 
64 In this regard, cf also infra, para. 3 of this Chapter. 
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form an agreement in order to initiate the proceedings, when the proceedings will then 
tell who the parties really are: such parties are, in fact, not known in advance, except 
in specific cases.  
Regarding jurisdiction based on appearance, the presentation then remarked that this 
provision should be approached with a certain degree of caution and, in particular, 
bearing in mind that the same notions may be construed differently across the several 
instruments of EU procedural law. 
c) Cooperation between courts 
Cooperation between courts is a cornerstone in EU family law. However, the 
Succession Regulation – unlike the Brussels II-bis Regulation, which in Article 15 
provides for the possibility to transfer jurisdiction – does not provide for such a 
possibility. According to Article 6 of the Succession Regulation, in the event of a 
choice of law made pursuant to Article 22, a court seised in accordance with Article 4 
or 10 may decline jurisdiction if it considers that the courts of the Member State of the 
chosen law are better placed to rule on the succession (para. (a)) or shall decline 
jurisdiction if the parties to the proceedings have agreed, in accordance with Article 5, 
to confer jurisdiction on a court or the courts of the Member State of the chosen law 
(para. (b)).65 However, the mechanism put forth under Article 6 is not streamlined and 
it will require restarting the procedure before the courts of the other Member State, 
thus possibly hampering cooperation in family matters.  
2. Recent jurisprudence of the CJEU 
The presentation then proceeded to address the case law of the CJEU, noting that 
such case law can be divided in two categories. The first one tackles the issue of 
scope and the coordination of the Succession Regulation with instruments on other 
subject matters: These cases have already been dealt with in the other segments of 
this Chapter for different purposes. The second one addresses the Succession 
Regulation per se. 
a) Rulings on scope and on the coordination of the Succession Regulation with 
other instruments 
With regard to scope, the presentation underscored that in the Kubicka case66 the 
Court ruled that Article 1(2)(k) and (l) and Article 31 of the Succession Regulation 
must be interpreted as precluding refusal, by an authority of a Member State (in the 
instant case, Germany), to recognise the material effects of a legacy ‘by vindication’, 
which is recognised by the law governing succession chosen by the testator in 
accordance with Article 22(1) of that Regulation (in the instant case, Polish law), 
when that refusal is based on the ground that the legacy concerns the right of 
ownership of immovable property located in that Member State whose law does not 
provide for legacies with direct material effect when succession takes place. In 
particular, the Court held that Article 31 of the Succession Regulation does not 
concern the method of the transfer of rights in rem, including, inter alia, legacies ‘by 
 
65 See also Art. 7(a) of the Succession Regulation, which mirrors and supports the mechanism put forth 
at Art. 6 by establishing that such courts shall have jurisdiction to rule on the succession if a court 
previously seised has declined jurisdiction in accordance with Article 6. 
66 CJEU, Judgment of 12.10.2017, Kubicka, C-218/16, ECLI:EU:C:2017:755, esp. para. 65. 
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vindication’ or ‘by damnation’, but only the respect of the content of rights in rem, 
determined by the law governing the succession (lex causae), and their reception in 
the legal order of the Member State in which they are invoked (lex rei sitae).67 
Therefore, in so far as the right in rem transferred by the legacy ‘by vindication’ is the 
right of ownership, which is recognised in German law, there is no need for the 
adaptation provided for in Article 31 of the Succession Regulation. Accordingly, Article 
31 of the Succession Regulation must be interpreted as precluding refusal of 
recognition, in a Member State whose legal system does not provide for legacies ‘by 
vindication’, of the material effects produced by such a legacy when succession takes 
place in accordance with the chosen succession law.68 
The presentation then proceeded to address the Mahnkopf judgment,69 reference to 
which was already made with regard to matrimonial property regimes.70 In the 
Mahnkopf judgment, the Court ruled that Article 1(1) of the Succession Regulation 
must be interpreted as meaning that a national provision which prescribes, on the 
death of one of the spouses, a fixed allocation of the accrued gains by increasing the 
surviving spouse’s share of the estate falls within the scope of that Regulation.  
As the presentation further emphasized, the coordination of succession matters with 
questions of parental responsibility also raises some interesting points: for instance, in 
the Matoušková judgment,71 the Court held that the Brussels II-bis Regulation must be 
interpreted as meaning that the approval of an agreement for the sharing-out of an 
estate concluded by a guardian ad litem on behalf of minor children constitutes a 
measure relating to the exercise of parental responsibility, within the meaning of 
Article 1(1)(b) of that Regulation and thus falls within the scope of the latter, and not a 
measure relating to succession. 
The presentation then proceeded to recall the decision rendered by the CJEU on the 
interplay between the Brussels II-bis Regulation and national civil procedure. In the 
Saponaro case,72 the parents of a minor lodged, in the name of the minor, an 
application for permission to renounce an inheritance before the courts of Member 
State other than the one in which both the parents and the minor are habitually 
resident. In this respect, the Court held that Article 12(3)(b) of the Brussels II-bis 
Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that the joint lodging of proceedings by 
the parents of the child before the courts of their choice amounts to an unequivocal 
acceptance by them of that court. The Court then stated that a prosecutor who, 
according to the national law, has the capacity of a party to the proceedings 
commenced by the parents, is a party to the proceedings within the meaning of Article 
12(3)(b) of the Brussels II-bis Regulation. Opposition by that party to the choice of 
jurisdiction made by the parents of the child in question, after the date on which the 
court was seised, precludes the acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the 
 
67 Ibid., para. 64. 
68 Ibid., para. 65. 
69 CJEU, Judgment of 1.03.2018, Mahnkopf, C-558/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:138. 
70 See supra, in Chapter D, para. II.1.c.  
71 CJEU, Judgment of 6.10.2015, Matoušková, C-404/14, ECLI:EU:C:2015:653. 
72 CJEU, Judgment of 19.04.2018, Saponaro and Xylina, C–565/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:265. 
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parties to the proceedings at that date from being established. In the absence of such 
opposition, the agreement of that party may be regarded as implicit and the condition 
of the unequivocal acceptance of prorogation of jurisdiction by all the parties to the 
proceedings at the date on which that court was seised may be held to be satisfied.  
b) Rulings on the Succession Regulation per se 
The presentation then proceeded to address the three judgments that the CJEU 
rendered on the Succession Regulation as such. Two of these judgments address 
issues related to national certificates of succession and tackle, on the one hand, the 
question of jurisdiction to issue such certificate and, on the other hand, the 
characterization of such certificates. A third judgment sheds the light on the optional 
nature of the form for the European Certificate of Succession. 
In the Oberle judgment73 the Court ruled that Article 4 of the Succession Regulation 
must be interpreted as precluding legislation of a Member State (in the instant case, 
Germany) which provides that, although the deceased did not, at the time of death, 
have his or her habitual residence in that Member State, the courts of that Member 
State are to retain jurisdiction to issue national certificates of succession, in the 
context of a succession with cross-border implications, where the assets of the estate 
are located in that Member State or the deceased was a national of that Member 
State. As the Court observed at paragraph 44, Article 4 determines the international 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States in relation to proceedings involving 
measures concerning the succession as a whole, such as, in particular, the issuing of 
national certificates of succession, irrespective of whether those proceedings are 
contentious or non-contentious. Article 4 refers, in particular, to the criterion of the 
habitual residence of the deceased at the time of death (in the instant case, located in 
France): it follows that applying national law (i.e., German law) ‘to determine the 
general jurisdiction of the courts of the Member States to issue national certificates of 
succession would be contrary to the objective thus set out in recital 27 of Regulation 
No 650/2012, which is intended to ensure consistency between the rules relating to 
jurisdiction and those relating to the applicable law in that area’. 74 
In WB75 the Court addressed the issue of the characterization that is to be given to a 
notarial certificate of succession and it ruled that such certificate, issued on the 
application of all parties, does not qualify as a ‘decision’ but as an ‘authentic 
instrument’, instead. Notably, the Court held that the first subparagraph of Article 3(2) 
of the Succession Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that a notary who draws 
up a deed of certificate of succession at the unanimous request of all the parties to 
the procedure conducted by the notary does not constitute a ‘court’ within the 
meaning of that provision. It follows that the notary does not need to verify its 
jurisdiction, because rules on jurisdiction apply to ‘courts’. In this respect, the speaker 
noted that this decision implements a trend that is visibly different that the one in 
Oberle, where the Court concentrated all kinds of certificates in the Member State that 
has jurisdiction. The Court stated that such a deed does not constitute a ‘decision’ 
 
73 CJEU, Judgment of 21 June 2018, Oberle, C-20/17, ECLI:EU:C:2018:485. 
74 Ibid., para. 52. 
75 CJEU, Judgment of 19.07.2019, WB, C-658/17, ECLI:EU:C:2019:444. 
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within the meaning of Article 3(1)(g) of the Succession Regulation and, rather, it 
constitutes an ‘authentic instrument’ within the meaning of Article 3(1)(i).  
Finally, in Brisch76 the Court clarified the optional (as opposed to mandatory) nature of 
the form for the European Certificate of Succession laid down in the Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1329/2014 establishing the Forms referred to in 
the Succession Regulation.77 In particular, the Court held that Article 65(2) of the 
Succession Regulation and Article 1(4) of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 
No 1329/2014 must be interpreted as meaning that, for the purposes of an 
application for a European Certificate of Succession, the use of Form IV in Annex 4 to 
Implementing Regulation No 1329/2014 is optional. 
3. National case law collected in the Project database: First considerations  
A first analysis of the national case law collected within the Project shows that 
succession matters are involved in approximately 20% of all the cases collected and 
uploaded onto the Project database, and 90% of those cases give application to the 
Succession Regulation. This proves that the EUFams II case law database is to be 
construed as a very helpful tool for the purposes of identifying open questions and 
paving the way towards a uniform understanding of the Succession Regulation.  
According to the statistical data that may be extracted from the database, among the 
problems that courts are currently facing are traditional questions related to the 
Succession Regulation and namely questions of jurisdiction and applicable law in 
connection with habitual residence, and the European Certificate of Succession. The 
fact that Article 4 and Article 21 of the Succession Regulation are often used indicates 
that habitual residence plays a role in many cases. Article 62 represents another focal 
point in the current case law as people apply for the deliverance of European 
Certificates of Succession.  
 
76 CJEU, Judgment of 17.01.2019, Brisch, C-102/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:34. 
77 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1329/2014 of 9 December 2014 establishing the 
Forms referred to in Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement 
of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of 
Succession, OJ L 359, 16.12.2014, p. 30–84. 
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Figure 1: Recurring succession matters as identified through the EUFams II case law database (chart courtesy of 
Mr. Philippos Siaplaouras, MPI Luxembourg) 
On the other hand, it is regrettable that questions of party autonomy and jurisdiction, 
namely under Articles 5(2) and 9, do not appear to be very recurrent. This is 
unfortunate in particular because these provisions have raised several issues and it 
would be interesting to see how they are used in practice.  
Concerning the question of habitual residence, some recurring patterns emerge from 
the case law of the national courts. The courts have, in fact, put forward a quasi-
objective criterion to identify habitual residence which takes into account the duration 
and frequency of the stays as well as the socio-economic and family relations 
(including work activity, language and where the family of the deceased resides).78 On 
the other hand, the presence of assets and nationality only play a subsidiary role and 
are seldom used, and the presence of a portfolio in one State is not enough to 
determine the habitual residence.  
Finally, the presentation tackled the question, which transpires from the national case 
law, whether there is a subjective element in the notion of habitual residence. From 
the Recitals of the Regulation, one can infer that the notion is to be understood 
objectively, however this is not a unanimous opinion. German courts, for example, 
tend to think that a subjective element is needed. A court from Hamm, for instance, 
ruled that the intention to remain for an indefinite time is required to satisfy the notion 
of habitual residence.79 This question is open and remains up for discussion. 
 
78 See, for instance, Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 1, 29 May 2019, 18-13.383, FRT20190529 
upholding Cour d’appel de Paris, 7 March 2018, n° 17/13293. The judgment is available in the 
EUFams II database as FRS20180307. 
79 OLG Hamm, Beschluss vom 02. Januar 2018 – I-10 W 35/17. The judgment is available in the 
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II. AN ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER REFLECTIONS  
1. Parallelism between different instruments 
The invited expert recalled the importance of, among other instruments, the 
Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults, which – in its 
interplay or comparison with other Hague conventions80 – mostly raises issues similar 
to those that arise as between the EU Regulations in family law matters. The 
presentation highlighted, for instance, that the 2000 Hague Convention is based on 
the Hague Convention of 19 October 1996 on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, 
Recognition, Enforcement and Co-Operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures for the Protection of Children and that the 2000 Hague Convention raises 
issues such as whether an adult has been heard in another jurisdiction and how to 
know if that adult has been heard. A clear parallel may be identified between this 
question and those concerning the hearing of children under the 1996 Hague 
Convention. 
2. Renvoi, no renvoi and limitations of scope 
The invited expert observed that, while the Succession Regulation does not directly 
bind the United Kingdom, the United Kingdom is still affected by the Regulation 
because of its own Private International Law rules. A British court will, in fact, apply 
the Regulation when the local Private International law rules point to the laws of 
another Member State. Therefore, the presentation proceeded to offer several inputs 
and insight with respect to the problems that arise, in particular, with regard to the 
interplay of the provisions on choice of law and renvoi. 
Article 34(2) of the Succession Regulation excludes renvoi if a valid choice of law was 
made in accordance with Article 22. The question, then, arises whether the choice of 
law is valid or not. For instance, the deceased may have drawn up several wills (for 
example, one for England and another for the rest of the world): the concern then 
arises as to whether the deceased can make a valid choice of the law applicable to his 
or her succession if he or she has more than one will, when Article 22 clearly says that 
the choice of law can be made in relation to the succession as a whole. 
The invited expert highlighted an open question also with regard to the possibility of 
making an implicit choice of law. Recital 39 of the Succession Regulation states that 
‘A choice of law should be made expressly in a declaration in the form of a disposition 
of property upon death or be demonstrated by the terms of such a disposition. A 
choice of law could be regarded as demonstrated by a disposition of property upon 
death where, for instance, the deceased had referred in his disposition to specific 
provisions of the law of the State of his nationality or where he had otherwise 
mentioned that law’. Recital 39 seems to open to the possibility that a choice of law be 
made implicitly: if this is correct, such implicit choice, too, affects renvoi by excluding 
it.  
According to Article 83(2) of the Regulation, if the deceased chose the law applicable 
to his or her succession prior to the date the Regulation became applicable (17 
 
80 All the instruments adopted in the framework of the Hague Conference on Private International Law 
cited in this Report may be found at https://www.hcch.net/, under ‘Instruments’. 
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August 2015), that choice shall be valid provided it meets the conditions laid down in 
Chapter III or if it is valid in application of the rules of private international law which 
were in force, at the time the choice was made, in the State in which the deceased 
had his habitual residence or in any of the States whose nationality he or she 
possessed. However, the provision at Article 83(4) gives the possibility of a ‘deemed’ 
choice by stating that, if a disposition of property upon death was made prior to 17 
August 2015 in accordance with the law which the deceased could have chosen in 
accordance with this Regulation, that law ‘shall be deemed to have been chosen as 
the law applicable to the succession’. Therefore, a choice can be based on Article 
83(4), instead of Article 22, and such choice does not have to be a choice of law for 
the whole succession: The deceased may have several wills that follow different 
choices based on one of the two provisions. However, in an instance such as the one 
at hand, it is difficult to know if renvoi applies: in fact, the Regulation does not state 
explicitly whether renvoi is excluded also vis-à-vis a choice made in accordance with 
Article 83(4). 
The invited expert also raised the question of what constitutes renvoi and what does 
not. The current English Inheritance Act of 1975 makes provision for a court to vary 
(and extend, when appropriate) the distribution of the estate of a deceased person to 
any spouse, former spouse, child, child of the family or dependant of that person in 
cases where the deceased person’s will or the standard rules of intestacy fail to make 
reasonable financial provision, but only provided the deceased was domiciled in 
England. The question arises as to whether this provision constitutes a limitation or a 
renvoi issue. In particular – the expert wondered – in the event that an English client, 
living in France, does not want French Law to apply, but English Law instead and he 
or she choose the Inheritance Act to govern his or her their estate, must the French 
court apply the Inheritance Act even though the deceased was not domiciled in 
England?  
3. The Succession Regulation and treaties with Third States 
The invited Expert brought to the attention of the participants the fact that a certain 
degree of lack of harmonization may be observed also with respect to treaties that 
Member States have entered into with Third States and that, to any extent, govern 
succession matters. For instance, he observed that – with regards to the 
Establishment and Consular Agreement concluded between Italy and Switzerland in 
Bern on 22 July 1868,81 and notably Article 17 thereof – a different interpretation of 
the scope of application of the Agreement may be detected: While according to the 
jurisprudence of the Swiss courts such Treaty applies for questions of jurisdiction but 
it also provides implied rules in regard to applicable law, in the understanding of 
Italian courts the Treaty only applies for jurisdiction and not for applicable law. The 
question of which interpretation should prevail is open and debated.  
While this issue does not really affect the application of the Succession Regulation, it 
is nevertheless of note that how treaties with Third States interact with the Regulation 
is a particularly complicated question, which also leaves some issues pending. For 
 
81 The text of the Treaty is available, in French, German and Italian, at 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/it/classified-compilation/18680003/index.html. 
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instance, if a Swiss citizen dies in Italy, it is clear from Article 17 of the Treaty that 
Switzerland has jurisdiction. However, the Treaty does not regulate how the 
deceased’s property located in Germany should be regulated. The question then 
arises as to whether the Succession Regulation applies in this case or whether the 
Treaty applies to the property located in Germany as a result of the fact that 
jurisdiction lies with the courts in Switzerland. 
III. THE REGULATION ON PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 
The presentation then moved on to introduce the Regulation 2016/1191 on Public 
Documents.82 The Regulation simplifies the circulation of certain public documents in 
the European Union: It was adopted on 6 July 2016 and applies in all EU Member 
States as from 16 February 2019.  
As the presentation emphasized, while the Regulation does not regulate family law 
matters per se, some of the formalities dealt with in the Regulation are of paramount 
importance for that area of the law: this justifies the inclusion of this Regulation in the 
scope of the EUFams II Project, in general, and of the presentation, in particular. In 
fact, the Regulation covers public documents issued in the areas that are sensitive 
and often arise – more often than not in the form of preliminary questions – in the 
context of succession matters, and notably: birth; a person being alive; death; name; 
marriage, including capacity to marry and marital status; divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment; registered partnership, including capacity to enter into a 
registered partnership and registered partnership status; dissolution of a registered 
partnership, legal separation or annulment of a registered partnership; parenthood; 
adoption; domicile and/or residence; nationality; absence of a criminal record, 
provided that public documents concerning this fact are issued for a citizen of the 
Union by the authorities of that citizen's Member State of nationality. 
As underlined in the presentation, the Regulation on Public Documents pursues the 
objective of curtailing excessive bureaucratic procedures and costs for citizens when 
they need to present in a Member State a public document issued in another Member 
State. For instance, as a result of the adoption of the Regulation public documents 
and their certified copies issued by the authorities of a Member State must be 
accepted as authentic by the authorities of another a Member State without the need 
of an authenticity stamp (i.e., the apostille). If the public document is not in one of the 
official languages of the Member State requesting the document, citizens can ask for 
a multilingual standard form, available in all EU languages, from the authorities of the 
a Member State which issued the public document.  
The presentation then underscored that the Regulation deals with the authenticity of 
public documents but not with the recognition of their legal effects in another Member 
State. The recognition of the legal effects of a public document is still governed by the 
national provisions on recognition in force in the Member State where the citizen 
presents the document. However, in applying their national law, Member State must 
 
82 Regulation (EU) 2016/1191 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 on 
promoting the free movement of citizens by simplifying the requirements for presenting certain public 
documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012, OJ L 200, 
26.7.2016, p. 1–136. 
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respect European Union law, including the case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, on the free movement of citizens within the European Union. 
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F. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The International Exchange Seminar culminated in the final conclusions that were 
drawn from the day’s discussions. It transpired from the exchanges that took place 
between the experts that, in comparing the area of European family and succession 
law with other areas of European private international and procedural law, the practice 
in European family and succession law sets itself apart. As the convenor of the 
conclusions observed, several instruments in this field are relatively new and this area 
of the law is characterised by uncertainties: scholars and practitioners need to find the 
path that assists them to overcome the obstacles that surround, in particular, the 
application in practice of these instruments. The uncertainty that surrounds these 
instruments is further increased as a result of a feature that is unique to succession 
and family law, and notably the fact that these areas of the law encompass personal 
and financial matters, combining economic aspects with tradition and culture.  
The convenor of the conclusions remarked that it is obviously impossible to 
summarise the discussions on so many instruments. However, he observed that 
several of the issues identified through the discussions related to characterisation 
were discussed throughout the International Exchange Seminar: notably, with respect 
to private divorces, marriages, vindication, and the delineation between succession 
law and matrimonial property. Another typical problem that arose from the discussions 
is the tension between binding concepts, on the one hand, and the choices 
individuals can make, on the other. One characteristic of all private international law 
instruments in the area of family and succession law is that they have pathed a way 
towards party autonomy in the applicable law. This development is to be welcomed: in 
fact, currently there is more diversity as to the personal lives of European citizens and, 
thus, there is a stronger need for party autonomy. On the other hand, the pressure on 
some matters may become stronger, as it became apparent during the discussions on 
public policy. 
